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C h r i s t o p h e r  B e a u c h a m p  
 
The First Patent Litigation Explosion 
abstract.  The twenty-first century “patent litigation explosion” is not unprecedented. In 
fact, the nineteenth century saw an even bigger surge of patent cases. During that era, the most 
prolific patent enforcers brought hundreds or even thousands of suits, dwarfing the efforts of 
today’s leading “trolls.” In 1850, New York City and Philadelphia alone had ten times more 
patent litigation, per U.S. patent in force, than the entire United States in 2013. Even the 
absolute quantity of late-nineteenth-century patent cases bears comparison to the numbers filed 
in recent years: the Southern District of New York in 1880 would have ranked third on the list of 
districts with the most patent infringement suits filed in 2014 and would have headed the list as 
recently as 2010. 
 This Article reveals the forgotten history of the first patent litigation explosion. It first 
describes the rise of large-scale patent enforcement in the middle of the nineteenth century. It 
then draws on new data from the archives of two leading federal courts to trace the development 
of patent litigation from 1840 to 1910 and to outline the scale, composition, and leading causes of 
the litigation boom. Finally, the Article explores the consequences of this phenomenon for the 
law and politics of the patent system. The effects of the litigation explosion were profound. The 
rise of large-scale patent assertion provides a new explanation for patent law’s crucial shift from 
common law to equity decision making in the middle of the nineteenth century. And at its 
height, the litigation explosion produced a political backlash that threatened to sweep away the 
patent system as we know it. Recovering the history of patent law during this formative and 
turbulent era offers fresh perspectives on the patent reform debates of today. 
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introduction 
The twenty-first century has witnessed a so-called “explosion” in patent 
litigation.1 The number of patent suits filed each year doubled during the 
1990s and continued to increase steadily during last decade, growing from 
around 2,500 in the year 2000 to over 3,500 in the year 2011.2 Since 2011, a 
change in joinder rules has propelled the number of suits still higher to over 
5,000 in 2012 and over 6,000 in 2013, before falling back to around 5,000 in 
2014.3 Although its precise nature and causes are contested,4 the rising volume 
 
1. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
401, 402 (2013). James Bessen and Michael Meurer use the term here to refer to  
the growth in litigation over the 1980s and 1990s, rather than in its (more contested)  
recent use as a description of the period 2011-2013. See also CHRIS BARRY ET AL., 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 6 (2012) (reporting an annual 
6.4% growth in patent actions filed from 1991 through 2011). 
2. LEX MACHINA, http://lexmachina.com [http://perma.cc/D8XP-L5NJ]. A “patent suit” for 
the purposes of this Article refers to a suit where the validity or infringement of a patent was 
at issue; it does not include, for example, purely contractual disputes arising over patent 
licenses or suits involving the disposition of patent rights in bankruptcy. Even under this 
relatively manageable definition, filing numbers differ from one source to another 
depending on sources and counting conventions. Most of the modern patent litigation data 
used in this Article were obtained from the legal analytics service Lex Machina, which 
collects filing information from courts’ electronic docket systems and other sources (and 
whose quality controls make it an appealing statistical source). Lex Machina counts suits 
transferred between districts in both the origin and destination courts; as such, 
commentators note that its data may potentially “inflate [case counts], perhaps by as much 
as 15-20%.” Jason Rantanen & Joshua Haugo, District Courts and Patent Cases, Part I, 
PATENTLY-O (Apr. 28, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/04/district-courts-patent 
.html [http://perma.cc/D5VF-SG4C]. On the other hand, unlike some sources, Lex Machina 
excludes cases brought under the false-marking provision of the patent statute, which 
prohibits deceptive marking of an unpatented product as covered by a patent, because it 
does “not consider them to be Patent cases.” Understanding the Data, LEX MACHINA, 
http://law.lexmachina.com/help/understanding-data [http://perma.cc/J4LW-2ET3]. Lex 
Machina’s explanation of its data is on file with the author.  
3. LEX MACHINA, supra note 2. 
4. The demonstrable effects of joinder rules aside, the absolute number of suits filed is not the 
best indicator of the number of actual disputes: the total number of plaintiffs and 
defendants provides a better metric. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking 
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 662-66 (2014). However, the 
number of suits remains a useful measure of the quantity and organization of patent 
business in the courts, and it provides the most practical basis for historical comparison. 
Debate also continues on the relative contributions of technological change, legal 
uncertainty, the growth of patenting, and the litigation tactics of nonpracticing entities. See, 
e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT 
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 16, 28 (2013); 
John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated 
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of litigation in the last fifteen years has generated criticism of the patent system 
as a whole. Detractors point to such problems as burdensome litigation and 
uncertainty costs,5 patent portfolio arms races among large technology 
companies,6 and the opportunistic enforcement of patent rights by speculative 
and/or unscrupulous actors—the dreaded, if ill-defined, “patent trolls.”7 A 
political response to the perceived crisis is in full swing, with legislation 
proposed at the federal and state levels aimed at mitigating abusive practices in 
patent assertion.8  
Despite the attention devoted to the modern surge in patent filings, this 
development is not as unprecedented as recent coverage presumes.9 In fact, the 
patent system of the mid-to-late nineteenth century was in some ways more 
litigious than that of the early twenty-first. Relative to the size of the patent 
 
Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12-28 (2009); Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 283, 316-20 (2011); Cotropia et al., supra, at 653, 666-67. 
5. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 120-46 (2008) [hereinafter BESSEN & 
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE]; James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE 
Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 399-407 (2014) [hereinafter Bessen & Meurer, The Direct 
Costs from NPE Disputes]. 
6. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and 
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010). 
7. The literature on these entities is vast. On its empirical, conceptual, and rhetorical outlines 
(and shortcomings), see, for example, Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and 
Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571 
(2009); Cotropia et al., supra note 4; and Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 457 (2012). 
8. See, e.g., BRIAN T. YEH & EMILY M. LANZA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43979, PATENT 
LITIGATION REFORM LEGISLATION IN THE 114TH CONGRESS (2015); Leah Chan Grinvald, 
Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 445-47 (2015); Paul R. Gugliuzza, 
Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. 
L. REV. 279, 283-87 (2015). 
9. See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 5, at 390-91 
(“[W]hile NPEs have been around a long time, over the last few years, NPE litigation  
has reached a wholly unprecedented scale and scope . . . .”); Dennis Crouch, Rush to  
Judgment: New Dis-Joinder Rules and Non-Practicing Entities, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 20,  
2011), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/rush-to-judgment-new-dis-joinder-rules-and 
-non-practicing-entities.html [http://perma.cc/69QE-G28L] (reporting fifty-four suits filed 
as “an all-time-high for a single day filing”). Ron Katznelson has recently reported that 
relative to the number of patents in force, the intensity of patent litigation in the 1920s and 
1930s was similar to that of modern (pre-2011) times, and that relative to GDP, the amount 
of litigation in those years was considerably higher than today. Ron D. Katznelson, A 
Century of Patent Litigation in Perspective 1 (Nov. 17, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2503140 [http://perma.cc/8ACC-4R7B]. Yet this helpful 
corrective misses the still larger story of patent litigation in the nineteenth century, where 
litigation was more frequent in both relative and absolute terms than in the 1920s and 1930s.  
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system, the gap is considerable: the national rate of litigation per patent in 2013 
was less than one-third of the rates in 1860 in New York City and Philadelphia 
alone. Those two cities had ten times more patent suits filed in 1850, per U.S. 
patent in force, than did the entire United States in 2013.10 Even in absolute 
terms, the scale of patent business in some nineteenth-century courts bears 
comparison to modern levels. In 1880, 381 infringement suits were filed in the 
U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, a number which 
would have ranked third on the list of districts with the most patent 
infringement litigation commenced in 2014 and would have headed that list as 
recently as 2010.11 Federal courts in New York State in 1880 recorded more 
than 650 infringement suits filed, more than any single state in 2011.12 At least 
one year in the late nineteenth century saw as many as a thousand suits filed in 
a single judicial district.13  
To put these numbers in still broader context, between the Patent Act of 
1952 and the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
1982, the number of patent suits filed nationwide averaged just over eight 
hundred per year.14 In the 1920s and 1930s, this number was slightly higher, 
 
10. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa. (Nov. 20, 2015) (on file with author); Author’s Database, 
C.C.S.D.N.Y. (Nov. 20, 2015) (on file with author); see also infra Section II.A (presenting 
data on the quantity of patent litigation in New York City and Philadelphia). 
11. LEX MACHINA, supra note 2; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y, supra note 10. Excluding 
false-marking cases, the 2010 rankings were led by the Eastern District of Texas (284 suits 
filed, excluding false-marking cases) and the District of Delaware (253). The 2014 rankings 
were headed by the Eastern District of Texas (1,427), the District of Delaware (946), and the 
Central District of California (323). LEX MACHINA, supra note 2. Until 1911, the U.S. circuit 
courts had jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent laws. See Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 
25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38; Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 17, 5 Stat. 117, 124. These circuit courts 
were trial courts and should not be confused with the circuit courts of appeals created in 
1891. Circuit courts were originally presided over seasonally by Justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court “riding circuit,” but by the later part of the nineteenth century they had evolved into 
permanent courts staffed by district or circuit judges with occasional participation by the 
Justices. The district and circuit courts officially merged in 1911. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 48-49 (2d ed. 2002).  
12. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D.N.Y. (Nov. 20, 2015) (on file with author); Author’s Database, 
C.C.N.D.N.Y. (Nov. 20, 2015) (on file with author); Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., 
supra note 10. By comparison, there were 599 patent suits filed in the Central, Eastern, 
Northern, and Southern Districts of California in 2011. LEX MACHINA, supra note 2. Again, 
false-marking cases are excluded from the 2011 numbers. 
13. Around 1,000 patent infringement suits were filed in the U.S. Circuit Court for the 
Northern District of New York in 1883, most of them on Nelson Green’s patent for the 
driven well. Author’s Database, C.C.N.D.N.Y, supra note 12.  
14. This is derived from the underlying data used in Katznelson, supra note 9. I am grateful to 
Ron Katznelson for sharing this information.  
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with an average of just under one thousand annual filings.15 Before the post-
2011 spike in filings, the modern peak of patent litigation was around two 
thousand eight hundred suits filed across the entire United States in 2004.16 
There is as yet no national-level data for the number of patent suits filed each 
year in the United States during the nineteenth century. But it seems likely that 
the volume of patent litigation in the late nineteenth-century United States 
routinely exceeded the number of suits filed during most of the twentieth 
century. And it is even possible that there were years in the nineteenth century 
when the absolute quantity of patent litigation approached or matched the levels 
of that during the early twenty-first. 
This Article is a historical study of the first patent litigation explosion. Its 
principal thesis is a novel descriptive claim: there was a surge of patent 
litigation in the middle part of the nineteenth century, the dimensions of which 
have not previously been recognized and the causes and effects of which have 
consequently not been explored. Using hitherto-untapped sources, the Article 
begins to sketch the outlines of the litigation boom and advances some theories 
about its composition, causes, and effects.  
The picture that emerges is of a world where patent law and litigation were 
even more legally and politically salient than they are today. Almost every high-
profile new technology of the nineteenth century passed through the courts. 
Patent battles broke out over water wheels, machine tools, mechanical 
harvesters, sewing machines, railroad equipment, rubber goods, the telegraph, 
telephone, and electric light, to say nothing of the phonograph, bicycle, 
automobile, and many other inventions. At the same time, the total litigation 
generated sometimes took place on a scale that was enormous for its day. As 
early as the 1840s, a few patent owners launched multistate enforcement efforts 
involving suits being filed by the hundreds.17 By the years after the Civil War, 
some individual enforcement campaigns produced thousands of suits, over 
inventions ranging from oil-well blasting to rubber dentures.18 
This phenomenon deserves exploration on its own terms. Despite the 
startling numerical comparisons between nineteenth- and twenty-first-century 
patent litigations, the aim of this Article is neither primarily to compare the 
two periods nor even to insist that they represent quantitatively parallel 
experiences of patent litigation. It would be misleading to assume that a patent 
case in the nineteenth century was the same phenomenon as a patent case in 
 
15. Id. 
16. LEX MACHINA, supra note 2. 
17. See infra Section I.A. 
18. See infra Section I.B. 
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the twenty-first century. Patent litigation in the nineteenth century was much 
cheaper: it operated under different procedural rules; namely, the scale and 
organization of business, the legal profession, and the federal courts were all 
profoundly different.19 Simply placing past and present litigation statistics 
alongside each other tells us little. Nevertheless, what was happening in the 
patent law of the mid-to-late nineteenth century belies the conclusion that 
patent litigation has not “exploded” before. Indeed, one can believe in the 
magnitude of the first patent litigation explosion even if one thinks that reports 
of the modern version are sorely exaggerated.20  
Determining the overall size and composition of the first patent litigation 
explosion is a still unfinished task. Until now, the only quantitative source used 
to gauge nineteenth-century patent litigation has been the published record of 
reported judicial decisions. The leading empirical work in this area, undertaken 
by the economic historian Zorina Khan, gathered all 795 reported opinions in 
patent cases that were issued in the period 1790-1860.21 Khan used these 
numbers to gauge the litigiousness of the patent system generally and to 
analyze the geographical distribution, industry breakdown, and outcomes of 
suits.22 Khan was reasonably careful about acknowledging the limitations of 
reported decisions as a source, but her results have been widely cited as 
indicating how much patent litigation there “was” in nineteenth-century 
 
19. See infra Sections I.C, II.B.3, III.B. 
20. See, e.g., Katznelson, supra note 9, at 9 (concluding that “the number of patent lawsuits 
surged in 2011-2013” but that “this is directly attributable to the America Invents Act  
(AIA) and is not reflective of an underlying increase in the number of litigated  
patent disputes”); Adam Mossoff, The “Patent Litigation Explosion” Canard, TRUTH ON  
MARKET (Oct. 18, 2012), http://truthonthemarket.com/2012/10/18/the-patent-litigation 
-explosion-canard [http://perma.cc/EJK4-D36F] (“[T]he complaints today about today’s 
patent litigation crisis arise more from unchecked intuitions about what feels like a bad 
situation, from unrealistic assumptions about how much certainty we can achieve in the 
patent system, and from emotionally-compelling anecdotes about innovators running into 
trouble with patents . . . .”). 
21. B. Zorina Khan, Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 55 
J. ECON. HIST. 58, 62-92 (1995), revised and reprinted in B. ZORINA KHAN, THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION 67, 69-105 (2005) [hereinafter KHAN, THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION].  
22. Khan measured litigiousness relative to a somewhat arbitrary denominator: the number of 
patents issued in the same decade as the reported decision. See KHAN, THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION, supra note 21, at 71. This number gives a very rough sense 
of the decade-by-decade relationship between the growth of litigation and the growth of 
patenting, but (especially given the age profile of litigated patents described infra Part II) it 
hardly describes the actual propensity to litigate available patents.  
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America.23 Unfortunately, nineteenth-century case reporting is a deeply flawed 
measure of actual litigation. First, cases litigated to a decision were only a small 
subset of all lawsuits filed, and reported decisions were a further, 
unrepresentative subset of that. Second, reporting coverage varied wildly over 
time and across different courts and was heavily affected by the practices of the 
individual reporters and judges. Published judicial opinions may be a good way 
to track the development of case law, but as a proxy for the actual number of 
historical patent disputes they are so problematic as to be nearly useless. 
As a result, the history of the litigation explosion must be found in other 
sources: in contemporary journalism, congressional reports, the histories of 
individual technologies, and, above all, the records of case filings preserved by 
the courts. Part I draws on these sources to sketch the most visible kind of 
patent litigation—the large-scale enforcement campaigns that did the most to 
shape the politics (and perhaps the law) of patents. This Part offers only the 
highlights of the patent litigation system during the nineteenth century, but it 
suggests the scale of enforcement and points to some of the dynamics that 
made patent law a high-profile legal battlefield. Part II then uses sampled data 
from the archives of two important federal courts, located in New York City 
and Philadelphia, to reconstruct the landscape of patent disputes and to get at 
the fine-grained detail of the litigation. The deep-dive approach confirms the 
existence of the litigation boom more generally and offers insights into the 
patents and parties involved. 
 The effects of the first litigation explosion on patent law range from the 
obvious to the subtle. On the more visible side are the political consequences of 
the great patent fights. Large-scale patent conflicts were live and controversial 
issues in federal and state politics during the mid-to-late nineteenth century. 
This state of affairs eventually provided the impetus for proposals to curtail 
patent litigation—to deter nuisance suits, to limit suits against small-scale users 
of patented technology, and on the state level, to institute consumer 
protection-type measures regulating the conduct of patent owners. As far as the 
courts are concerned, the doctrinal effects of the litigation explosion are harder 
to capture. That said, this period covered the classic formative era of American 
patent jurisprudence, and the mark of heavy litigation is visible on at least 
some major areas of judge-made patent law. Above all, the effects of large-scale 
litigation can be detected in patent litigation’s shift to equity, a hugely 
 
23. See, e.g., Jonathan Rothwell et al., Patenting Prosperity: Invention and Economic Performance  
in the United States and Its Metropolitan Areas, BROOKINGS INST. 9, 43 n.76  
(Feb. 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/02/patenting 
-prosperity-rothwell/patenting-prosperity-rothwell.pdf [http://perma.cc/TAD4-QUTU]. 
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important nineteenth-century development whose timing and causes have 
hitherto been misunderstood. These results are discussed in Part III.  
The Article concludes on a note of historical comparison. For those 
grappling with the notion of a “patent crisis” today, the nineteenth century 
offers a highly resonant earlier example of patent law under institutional and 
political stress. Both of these periods feature the rise of an aggressive, 
entrepreneurial system of patent litigation, met and countered by a backlash 
against abusive patent enforcement. To a modern observer, the content of the 
earlier legal and regulatory reactions can seem strikingly familiar. Many of the 
measures now proposed or attempted as solutions for the ills of modern patent 
litigation were proposed or attempted in the nineteenth century as well. As a 
result, arguments based on historical examples from past patent struggles have 
begun to filter into recent commentary on patent reform. Yet crucially, they 
have done so without the necessary context of the first patent litigation 
explosion. Recovering the broader history of patent law, I suggest, offers new 
perspectives on some of these arguments and sets the lessons of the past on a 
more solid foundation.  
i .  the rise  of  large-scale patent l it igation  
The first patent litigation explosion covered a period lasting roughly from 
the mid-1840s to the mid-1880s. It overlapped to a large extent with the great 
surge of patenting that occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century. It also 
followed close behind the foundational administrative reform of U.S. patent 
law, the Patent Act of 1836. Chronology alone might suggest that the rise of 
patent business in the courts reflected the expansion of patenting under a new 
and improved system of patent rights. Yet the relationship between reform, 
patenting, and litigation was not so straightforward.  
The period between 1850 and 1870 saw the highest rate of growth in 
patenting in U.S. history.24 During the 1850s, the number of applications and 
grants more than tripled, to more than six thousand applications filed and 
more than four thousand patents granted in 1859.25 After the Civil War, the 
number of grants tripled again, to almost thirteen thousand by 1869.26 The 
acceleration of the 1850s and 1860s began a sustained half-century climb in the 
 
24. Alan C. Marco et al., The USPTO Historical Patent Data Files: Two Centuries of Innovation 16-
17 (U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Econ., Working Paper No. 2015-1, 2015), http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2616724 [http://perma.cc/6J9E-RD3E].  
25. 3 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT, 3-426 to 
-27 tbl.Cg27-37 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., millennial ed. 2006). 
26. Id. 
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numbers of patents issued (Figure 1). Patenting per capita similarly rose 
sharply and by the 1870s and 1880s had reached levels comparable to those that 
prevailed for most of the twentieth century (Figure 2). 
Figure 1.  
u.s. patents issued annually, sample years 1830-191027 
 
 
27.  Id. 
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Figure 2. 
u.s. patents issued per million u.s. residents, sample years 1790-200028 
 
 
The explosion of patenting rested on an important institutional 
foundation: the Patent Act of 1836, which created the first truly modern patent 
system. Since 1793, American patent law had operated as a registration regime, 
under which applications were simply filed with an office in the State 
Department, and questions of novelty and validity were generally left for the 
courts to resolve.29 In response to widespread complaints about the poor 
quality of patents granted in this way, Congress acted in 1836 to create a 
reorganized Patent Office with a staff of professional examiners.30 The new 
Patent Office greatly increased the presumptive value of grants by conducting 
an ex ante check on their validity, and by providing a vital institutional 
platform for formalizing patent practice and disseminating information about 
new inventions.31 The 1836 Act did not immediately result in an expansion of 
 
28.  1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT, supra 
note 25, at 1-28 to -29 tbl.Aa6-8; 3 id. at 3-426 to -427 tbl.Cg27-37. 
29. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318. 
30. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; S. REP. NO. 24-338, at 4-8 (1836); EDWARD C. 
WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 322-45, 421-32 (1998); Steven Lubar, The Transformation of 
Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 932, 940-42 (1991).  
31. See KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION, supra note 21, at 53-55; Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for Technology, 1870-
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patenting, however. In fact, the number of grants initially fell as a result of the 
more rigorous examination system and the economic downturn that began 
with the Panic of 1837. Patent grants did not return to their pre-1836 levels 
until 1849.32 
In the meantime, the most conspicuous development in midcentury patent 
law was the appearance of large-scale enforcement campaigns. A relatively 
small number of patent grants accounted for what was then an enormous 
quantity of litigation. The details of these efforts varied. Some of the most 
notable examples involved older technologies from the first wave of American 
industrialization—and patents from before the 1836 Act. Others involved the 
cutting-edge inventions of the 1840s. While most of the early large-scale patent 
assertion campaigns benefited in some way from the statutory changes of the 
1830s, it was not the new examination procedure that mattered: instead, these 
patentees took advantage of other pro-patentee tools that had become 
available, especially term extension and reissue.33 Many of the leading 
campaigns also involved politics in one way or another, relying on lobbying 
and patronage in a fashion that belied the ostensibly bureaucratic and 
technocratic tenor of the new Patent Office administration.  
Several of these large-scale assertion efforts have attracted historical 
attention as discrete (and dramatic) episodes in the history of technology or 
patent law.34 However, these efforts have not hitherto been considered as a 
collective phenomenon. The Sections that follow aim to draw out both the 
diversity and commonalities of large-scale patent litigation efforts, showing the 
range of technologies and geographical regions involved even as certain core 
features recurred. Surveying the major campaigns can give only a selective view 
of the patent litigation system during the nineteenth century, but it indicates 
the magnitude of nationwide enforcement and reveals some features common 
to the leading examples. 
 
1920, in FINANCE, INTERMEDIARIES, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 209, 213-14 (Stanley L. 
Engerman et al. eds., 2003). 
32. 3 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT, supra 
note 25, at 3-426 to -27 tbl.Cg27-37; see also Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventive Activity in Early 
Industrial America: Evidence from Patent Records, 1790-1846, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 813, 818-20 
(1988).  
33. Term extension was provided for by the 1836 Act. See § 18, 5 Stat. at 124-25. Reissue was an 
administrative innovation approved by statute in 1832. See Act of July 3, 1832, ch. 162, § 3, 4 
Stat. 559, 559; Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 240-44 (1832) (affirming the 
Secretary of State’s authority to cancel and reissue patents).  
34. See infra Sections II.A, II.B.  
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A. Antebellum Patent Wars 
Many of the patents that generated the most litigation in the years after the 
1836 Act were not issued under the new law. Instead, these rights had been 
granted under the earlier registration regime and dated back to the 1820s or 
earlier. Given the standard fourteen-year term of a patent, such patents would 
ordinarily have expired by the early 1840s, at the latest. A select few, however, 
survived into midcentury thanks to term extensions—a feature that made them 
unusual among patents generally but characteristic of those that generated the 
most litigation in the 1840s and 1850s. Term extensions could be granted 
legislatively, by congressional private act,35 or administratively, under the 1836 
Patent Act, by a board of senior federal officeholders consisting of the Secretary 
of State, the Solicitor of the Treasury, and the Commissioner of Patents.36 The 
theory behind extensions, as stated in the 1836 Act, was to reward a deserving 
patentee who had “without neglect or fault on his part . . . failed to obtain, 
from the use and sale of his invention, a reasonable remuneration for the time, 
ingenuity, and expense bestowed upon the same.”37 In practice, the definition 
of “fail[ure] to obtain . . . a reasonable remuneration” proved elastic, and 
energetic lobbying secured extensions for several of the most lucrative patents 
of their day. Term extension raised the stakes both for and against a patent: it 
allowed patentees to enforce their rights over a more mature and thus more 
valuable technology, and it stimulated legal and political resistance to 
monopolies that were widely attacked as illegitimate. 
The leading examples concerned ubiquitous technologies of early American 
industrialization. Two patents in particular controlled important advances in 
the mechanization of woodworking technology. Thomas Blanchard’s turning 
lathe enabled the shaping of wood into irregular forms such as gun stocks, tool 
handles, and shoe lasts, reducing to a ten-minute task what might have taken a 
skilled last-maker hours to complete using hand tools.38 His patent, granted in 
1819, was not enforced intensively during its initial term. In 1834, however, 
Blanchard secured from Congress a private act extending his patent’s term by 
 
35. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 543-44 (1852) (listing twenty-five patent 
extensions by private act between 1808 and 1847). 
36. § 18, 5 Stat. at 124. From 1848, the power to grant extensions was vested in the 
Commissioner of Patents alone. Patent Act of 1848, ch. 47, § 1, 9 Stat. 231, 231. 
37. § 18, 5 Stat. at 125. 
38. Carolyn C. Cooper, A Patent Transformation: Woodworking Mechanization in Philadelphia, 
1830-1856, in EARLY AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY: MAKING AND DOING THINGS FROM THE 
COLONIAL ERA TO 1850, at 278, 316-17 (Judith C. McGaw ed., 1994). 
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fourteen years.39 With this extension in hand, Blanchard expanded the reach of 
his patent enforcement. According to his biographer, Carolyn Cooper, the 
inventor brought “dozens and dozens” of suits against woodworkers, 
continuing the campaign after a controversial second congressional extension 
was allowed in 1848.40 Reported decisions, most of which were from between 
1846 and 1855, trace a line of cases through Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Connecticut, and Pennsylvania.41  
William Woodworth’s planing machine patent had a shorter duration than 
the Blanchard patent, lasting “only” twenty-eight years from 1828 to 1856, but 
it evidently cut more broadly. “No patent, it is believed, which has ever been 
granted in this country, has been so much litigated as this one,” remarked 
Justice McLean in 1853, on one of the patent’s numerous visits to the Supreme 
Court.42 The technology at issue was unquestionably a valuable one. The 
cylinder-head planing machine enabled the rapid production of wooden boards 
that were flat; smooth; had a uniform thickness; and featured tongues, 
grooves, and molded features suiting them for floorboards, doors, and other 
elements of house construction.43 What had once been a journeyman’s 
multiday floorboarding job could now be completed in under two hours.44 
Woodworth, a carpenter from Hudson, New York, conceived a machine along 
these lines for which he received a patent in 1828.45 However, lacking capital to 
develop or manufacture it, Woodworth quickly parted with his rights: he first 
granted a half share to his local congressman James Strong, and then joined 
Strong in selling territorial assignments to purchasers across the country.46 
It was only after the inventor’s death in 1839 that the Woodworth patent 
became a phenomenon.47 The grant was extended twice in quick succession, 
first by the board of commissioners in 1842, then for an additional seven years 
by act of Congress in 1845.48 By that time, the patent had come under the 
control of a syndicate led by James G. Wilson, one of Woodworth’s early 
 
39. H.R. REP. NO. 23-397, at 1-2 (1834). 
40. Carolyn C. Cooper, Social Construction of Invention Through Patent Management: Thomas 
Blanchard’s Woodworking Machinery, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 960, 982 (1991). 
41. CAROLYN C. COOPER, SHAPING INVENTION: THOMAS BLANCHARD’S MACHINERY AND PATENT 
MANAGEMENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 48-54 (1991). 
42. Brooks v. Fiske, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 212, 224 (1853) (McLean, J., dissenting). 
43. Cooper, supra note 38, at 280, 293. 
44. Id. at 293. 
45. U.S. Patent No. X5,315 (issued Dec. 27, 1828).  
46. Cooper, supra note 38, at 296.  
47. Id. at 303-04. 
48. Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 658-62 (1846). 
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assignees.49 The syndicate established a network of assignees that functioned 
as an interregional cartel, setting the price of boards planed on Woodworth-
type machines and taking a royalty on each one.50 By 1852, a hostile 
congressional committee estimated—how realistically is not clear—that $9 
million in annual sales of lumber were covered by the scheme and that the 
owners of the patent had received around $2 million in royalties.51 
Unsurprisingly, the Woodworth interests were both able and willing to launch 
hundreds of infringement suits against those who resisted the patent. Wilson 
claimed to Congress in 1850 that $150,000 had been spent on litigation costs.52 
The Blanchard and Woodworth campaigns did not stand alone. Another 
prominent enforcement effort was that of Zebulon Parker, a millwright from 
Ohio, who with his brother Austin Parker had developed an improved reaction 
water wheel in the 1820s and obtained a patent for their invention in 1829.53 
The wheel provided superior power generation, and its use spread among 
water-powered mills. In 1843, with the patent about to expire, Zebulon Parker 
obtained a seven-year extension.54 This was rare, though not unprecedented: 
the board of commissioners empowered to grant extensions did so seven times 
between 1836 and 1844.55 Much more striking was the scale of the subsequent 
campaign to enforce the patent. Agents spread across the countryside, seeking 
license fees of between $10 and $50 per mill (equivalent to between $300 and 
$1,500 in 2014).56 A correspondent of the journal Scientific American noted that 
Zebulon Parker’s representatives had visited “all, or nearly all, of the saw mills” 
in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, during 1848.57 Ohio and Pennsylvania 
were the focus of Zebulon Parker’s enforcement efforts,58 but agents were 
 
49. Cooper, supra note 38, at 303-04.  
50. H.R. REP. NO. 32-156, at 9 (1852); Cooper, supra note 38, at 304. 
51. H.R. REP. NO. 32-156, at 3-6.  
52. H.R. REP. NO. 31-150, at 4-5 (1850).  
53. Edwin T. Layton, Jr., Scientific Technology, 1845-1900: The Hydraulic Turbine and the Origins 
of American Industrial Research, 20 TECH. & CULTURE 64, 68-70 (1979); Zebulon Parker, 
Sketch of the Invention of Parker’s Water Wheel, 52 J. FRANKLIN INST. 48, 48-49 (1851).  
54. See Case v. Redfield, 5 F. Cas. 258, 259 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849) (No. 2,494). 
55. 1845 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS. 
56. Controversial.—Parker’s Water Wheels, SCI. AM., Oct. 6, 1849, at 21; J.R. Lippincott, 
Woodworth’s and Parker’s Renewal of Patents, SCI. AM., Apr. 24, 1852, at 251. Present-day 
amounts are based on an extended consumer price index. See Samuel H. Williamson, 
Purchasing Power of Money in the United States from 1774 to Present, MEASURINGWORTH.COM, 
http://www.measuringworth.com/ppowerus [http://perma.cc/ND7X-2GT6]. 
57. Controversial.—Parker’s Water Wheels, supra note 56, at 21. 
58. Id.; Lippincott, supra note 56, at 251. 
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reported as far afield as Vermont and New Hampshire.59 Mill owners who 
resisted were haled into court. By 1849, a reporter’s note on one case identified 
more than two hundred Parker cases then pending in Ohio alone.60 The 
following year, the Parker brothers’ relative Oliver H.P. Parker, who held the 
rights for the patent in five states, filed 150 suits in the federal court in 
Philadelphia.61 
Not every notorious attempt to assert patent control was as successful. One 
prominent effort concerned the mechanical reaper. The first practical versions 
of this machine were invented in the early 1830s by Obed Hussey of Ohio and 
Cyrus McCormick of Virginia.62 Hussey was the first to patent, in 1833, but 
was less commercially successful.63 McCormick, on the other hand, became the 
leading manufacturer of reaping machines in a fast-growing and potentially 
vast market. Unfortunately, large-scale production began only in the late 
1840s, just as McCormick’s 1834 patent was reaching the end of its term.64 
McCormick then sought an extension of the patent—an attempt that prompted 
fierce resistance and became “un cause célèbre” in Congress around 1850.65 An 
early historian reported that “an immense array of political, social, and 
commercial influence was brought to bear against it by a combination of patent 
attorneys, rival manufacturers, and agricultural interests; and in the end it was 
defeated.”66 In the 1850s, McCormick renewed his campaign via litigation on 
his subsequent improvement patents, but despite his committing substantial 
resources to these suits, they were largely unsuccessful.67  
Alongside the long-lived Parker, Blanchard, and Woodworth grants, a 
second group of major patent campaigns stamped their mark on midcentury 
 
59. Parker and Re-Action Water Wheels, SCI. AM., Mar. 20, 1852, at 211. 
60. See Parker v. Stiles, 18 F. Cas. 1163, 1170 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 10,749). 
61. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Bill of Complaint, Parker v. Bell, Equity 
Case No. 13 (Oct. Term 1849) (C.C.E.D. Pa. Jun. 1850) (on file with the National Archives 
at Philadelphia) (detailing assignment to Oliver H.P. Parker of territorial rights for the 
Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and 
Massachusetts).  
62. DAVID A. HOUNSHELL, FROM THE AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS PRODUCTION, 1800-1932: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 154 (1984). 
63. Id.  
64. Id. at 155-56. 
65. REUBEN GOLD THWAITES, CYRUS HALL MCCORMICK AND THE REAPER 246-47 (1909). 
66. Id. at 248. 
67. See CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 505-10 (1974); GORDON M. WINDER, 
THE AMERICAN REAPER: HARVESTING NETWORKS AND TECHNOLOGY, 1830-1910, at 45 n.19 
(2012). 
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America. These were for more recent inventions, patented under the 1836 Act: 
technologies such as the telegraph, vulcanized rubber, and the sewing machine. 
 Samuel F.B. Morse’s telegraph invention was deeply entangled in patent 
politics from the beginning. Henry Ellsworth, the first Commissioner of 
Patents under the 1836 Act, had known Morse for years and sought to make 
Morse’s invention and 1840 patent into an advertisement for Ellsworth’s new 
patent administration.68 On Morse’s part, the bid for patent monopoly was 
part of a complex political and business strategy. The inventor and his 
associates originally planned to sell Morse’s telegraph patent to the federal 
government, and most of their early publicity and construction efforts were 
directed to that end.69 When the hoped-for congressional purchase failed to 
occur, Morse turned to licensing and promoting the construction of telegraph 
lines under the auspices of his patent.70 Litigation followed, with a sequence of 
battles in Ohio, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania,71 culminating at the Supreme 
Court in O’Reilly v. Morse.72 In its famous decision on the law of patent scope, a 
divided Court upheld Morse’s patent while invalidating its broadest claim, 
denying Morse what his opponents claimed would be a monopoly over the 
telegraph.73 
Charles Goodyear’s vulcanized rubber patent was similarly backed  
by aggressive litigation. In the late 1830s, Goodyear was a manufacturer  
in the struggling New England rubber industry. Through painstaking 
experimentation, he produced a number of new rubber goods and processes, 
including the vulcanization method that he began to develop in 1839 and 
patented in 1844.74 Goodyear then began granting product-specific licenses to 
firms making particular rubber goods, shoes, and fabrics.75 Goodyear’s legal 
 
68. RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 39-40, 
47-49 (2010). 
69. Id. at 53-64. 
70. Id. at 66-68, 74-75. 
71. See, e.g., Smith v. Ely, 22 F. Cas. 533 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 13,043); Morse v. O’Reilly, 17 
F. Cas. 871 (C.C.D. Ky. 1848) (No. 9,859); Morse v. O’Reilly, 17 F. Cas. 867 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1847) (No. 9,858). 
72. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). 
73. Id. at 113 (“In fine he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not 
described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained 
his patent. The court is of the opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by 
law.”); Adam Mossoff, O’Reilly v. Morse 41 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper 
No. 14-22, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2448363 [http://perma.cc/Y8UU-SNSS]. 
74. Cai Guise-Richardson, Redefining Vulcanization: Charles Goodyear, Patents, and Industrial 
Control, 1834-1865, 51 TECH. & CULTURE 357, 361-70 (2010). 
75. Id. at 374. 
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and commercial success depended on two supplemental efforts. One was a 
reissue amendment to the patent that broadened its scope.76 The other pillar of 
Goodyear’s success was litigation. Relations with both licensees and unlicensed 
manufacturers were contentious, and Goodyear brought more than two 
hundred suits in the late 1840s and early 1850s.77 These reached a peak in 1852, 
with Goodyear’s victory in what was universally called the “Great India-
Rubber Case” at Trenton, New Jersey.78 Finally, notwithstanding his victory 
there, Goodyear was able to persuade the Commissioner of Patents to extend 
his patent for an additional seven years, on the grounds that “[n]o inventor 
probably ha[d] ever been so harassed, so trampled upon, so plundered by that 
sordid and licentious class of infringers known . . . as ‘pirates.’”79 
While Goodyear’s campaign represented the dominance of a single patent 
over a new technology, the sewing machine produced a thicket of conflicting 
grants. During the 1850s, it was essentially impossible to manufacture a state-
of-the-art sewing machine without running afoul of the overlapping patents 
covering different features of the device.80 At the heart of the dispute was the 
1846 grant to Elias Howe, a penurious independent mechanic who had made 
early progress toward a working sewing machine but had not achieved a 
commercially viable product.81 Other crucial contributions to the technology 
were made and patented by a variety of inventors and manufacturers, including 
Allen B. Wilson and Isaac Merritt Singer.82 Most companies submitted to 
Howe in the early 1850s, but costly litigation among the major firms continued 
to worsen, eventually becoming a “Sewing Machine War,” in which suits and 
countersuits riddled the industry.83 Eventually, in 1856, the leading 
manufacturers combined in a patent pool called the Sewing Machine 
 
76. Id. at 378-81. For the details of Goodyear’s reissue, see infra notes 205-206 and 
accompanying text. 
77. RICHARD KORMAN, THE GOODYEAR STORY: AN INVENTOR’S OBSESSION AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR A RUBBER MONOPOLY 105-06 (2002); Guise-Richardson, supra note 74, at 360, 375-77. 
78. See R.C. GRIER, DECISION IN THE GREAT INDIA RUBBER CASE OF CHARLES GOODYEAR VS. 
HORACE H. DAY (1852). 
79. Charles Goodyear, 101 N. AM. REV. 65, 98 (1865) (citing In re Goodyear Patent, 1858 Dec. 
Comm’r Pat. 9). 
80. Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine 
War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 172-73 (2011) (describing the complementary 
technologies that made up the machine). 
81. Id. at 176-77.  
82. Id. at 177-80.  
83. Id. at 184-86, 190-92. 
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Combination.84 Litigation among the member firms was stilled, but suits 
against outsiders continued in large quantities.85 The Combination’s pool 
agreement provided for the maintenance of a litigation fund of over $10,000, 
funded from license payments—an amount larger than the annual sales of most 
small manufacturers.86 For his part, Howe’s success in enforcing his patent 
across the industry ultimately brought him vast rewards: through licensing 
and his role in the Sewing Machine Combination, he claimed to have earned 
$444,000 by 1860.87 In that year, Howe secured a seven-year term extension, 
which brought his total royalty earnings to $2 million by the time the patent 
expired.88 
B. Postwar Patent Campaigns 
The last third of the nineteenth century saw patent rights and patented 
inventions emerge as a still greater force in America’s industrial development. 
Over six hundred thousand patents were issued in the United States between 
1865 and 1900, more than ten times the number created in the seventy-five 
years prior to the end of the Civil War.89 The exploitation of these rights 
became a signature theme of the period. Sprawling legal campaigns 
accompanied not only the great high-technology inventions of the age, such as 
electric lamps and telephones,90 but also less esoteric articles like baking 
powder91 and barbed wire.92 The battles over these technologies would equal 
 
84. Ryan L. Lampe & Petra Moser, Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-
Century Sewing Machine Industry 8-9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
15061, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15061.pdf [http://perma.cc/JRU8-ZYUW].  
85. Mossoff, supra note 80, at 196; Lampe & Moser, supra note 84, at 15. The total number of 
suits is unknown, but, as an indicator of scale, Massachusetts alone saw more than 140 suits 
filed between 1857 and 1870. Author’s Database, C.C.D. Mass (Nov. 20, 2015) (on file with 
author). The underlying data are based on docket information provided by the National 
Archives at Boston. 
86. Lampe & Moser, supra note 84, at 9-10.  
87. Mossoff, supra note 80, at 193. 
88. Id. 
89. 3 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT, supra 
note 25, at 3-425 to -27 tbl.Cg27-37. 
90. See infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text. 
91. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. ex rel. Hecker v. Rumford Chem. Works, 32 F. 608, 616 (C.C.D.R.I. 
1876) (reporting the allegation that “the Rumford Chemical Works ha[s] instituted a large 
number of suits, in different circuits”). 
92. See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.  
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the midcentury patent wars in political intensity and would surpass them in 
number and scale. 
Again, the litigation took place in a number of different sectors and 
settings. A few of the largest campaigns of the 1860s continued patent assertion 
efforts that had begun before the Civil War. Foremost among them was the 
litigation mounted by the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company, which grew 
out of the 1850s Goodyear rubber litigation while adding a new dimension of 
mass enforcement. This enterprise began as the American Hard Rubber 
Company (AHRC), which held exclusive rights for the dental use of rubber 
patents issued to Charles Goodyear’s brother, Nelson Goodyear, in 1851.93 The 
AHRC licensed dentists and dental-equipment retailers to mix and set rubber 
dentures, and filed a few suits against infringers in the late 1850s.94 
In 1866, the dental vulcanite wars began in earnest. The patent lawyer and 
AHRC principal Samuel A. Duncan organized the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite 
Company and began a nationwide legal campaign to extract license payments 
from every dentist who provided rubber dentures.95 License terms began at a 
minimum of thirty-five dollars per year (equivalent to around five hundred 
dollars in 2014), rising to fifty dollars if payments were not made promptly 
upon demand.96 More than two thousand cases were reportedly filed in the 
federal courts in a campaign of extreme bitterness and great ruthlessness on the 
company’s part.97 According to the New York Times, “servants of dentists were 
bribed, next-door neighbors were questioned, and intimidation was often 
resorted to.”98 The company’s signature method was allegedly 
to employ a beautiful young lady, whom no dentist would suspect. She 
would call upon the dentist and have him take an impression, to be 
reproduced in rubber. She was liberal with her money, and only 
particular on the one subject of the rubber. This once obtained, she had 
all the evidence requisite to enable [the company] to bring suit.99  
 
93. See Bill of Complaint, Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Avery, Equity Case No. 21 (Oct. 
Term) (C.C.E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1870) (on file with the National Archives at Philadelphia). 
94. Id. 
95. Id.  
96. Killing His Persecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1879, at 5. Again, present value is calculated 
according to an extended consumer price index. See Williamson, supra note 56. 
97. Notes, 11 ALB. L.J. 307, 307 (1875); Killing His Persecutor, supra note 96, at 5. 
98. Killing His Persecutor, supra note 96, at 5. 
99. Id. 
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Inflamed by both the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company’s financial 
demands and its methods, dentists organized collective resistance through 
protective associations and pooled their legal efforts, but were largely 
unsuccessful in fighting off infringement suits. When Nelson Goodyear’s 
(extended) patent expired in 1872, the company continued its practices using 
John Cummings’s 1864 patent for hard-rubber dentures.100 The Vulcanite 
Company’s extraction of tribute from the dental profession ended only after 
the leader of its aggressive strategy, company treasurer Josiah Bacon, was 
murdered in San Francisco by a desperate dentist accused of patent 
infringement.101 
Far from the urban setting of the dental-vulcanite litigation, patent battles 
also flourished in rural and extractive sectors. In the mid-1860s, Colonel E.A.L. 
Roberts developed a method of increasing oil-well capacity by blasting with an 
explosive “torpedo.”102 The effectiveness of the technique immediately placed it 
in high demand among well owners. As it happened, Roberts was a former 
dental-equipment inventor and manufacturer who had once been in litigation 
against the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company.103 He had a number of 
patents already to his name and was likely all too well aware of the possibilities 
of large-scale patent enforcement. Roberts obtained a patent for his torpedo 
method in 1866 and set up factories manufacturing torpedoes and nitro-
glycerin; he reportedly charged well owners “exorbitant prices,” such as “two-
hundred dollars for a medium shot.”104 In response, moonlighters sprang up 
across western Pennsylvania’s oil country to engage in unlicensed blasting 
activities, often under cover of night. “The Roberts crowd hired a legion of 
spies to report operators who patronized the nocturnal well-shooters,” recalled 
an unsympathetic journalist.105 “The country swarmed with these emissaries. 
You couldn’t spit in the street or near a well after dark without danger of 
 
100. See Transcript of Record at 1-4, Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486 (1876) 
(No. 311) (describing Cummings’s patent and attendant litigation). 
101. Killing His Persecutor, supra note 96, at 5; Carmine Prioli, Rubber Dentures for the Masses, 7 
AM. HERITAGE INVENTION & TECH. MAG. 28 (1991), http://www.inventionandtech.com 
/content/rubber-dentures-masses-1 [http://perma.cc/A8VE-KKKF]; Author’s Database, 
C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra note 10. 
102. J.T. HENRY, THE EARLY AND LATER HISTORY OF PETROLEUM 542-43 (Philadelphia, J.B. 
Rodgers Co. 1873).  
103. Goodyear v. Wait, 10 F. Cas. 729, 732 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 5,587); HENRY, supra note 
102, at 540-41.  
104. JOHN J. MCLAURIN, SKETCHES IN CRUDE OIL: SOME ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS OF THE 
PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT IN ALL PARTS OF THE GLOBE 334 (1898). 
105. Id. at 386. 
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hitting one of the crew.”106 In the face of organized resistance from a 
producers’ association of well owners,107 Roberts filed more than two thousand 
suits in the Western District of Pennsylvania during the 1870s.108 
Neither the Goodyear nor the Roberts patent fights, however, were the 
most expansive or controversial enforcement efforts taking place after the Civil 
War. That honor collectively went to several campaigns that asserted patents 
for staple agricultural devices against individual farmers, particularly in the 
Midwest. Perhaps the most notorious of these was the campaign asserting the 
“driven well” patent, issued in 1868 to Nelson W. Green.109 Green was a 
somewhat unstable character. As the young commander of a wartime volunteer 
regiment in Cortland, New York, he had shot a captain in a disciplinary 
dispute, been relieved of his command, faced accusations of insanity, and 
become involved in litigation against his own pastor.110 During his military 
service, however, he had instituted a method of drawing groundwater for his 
unit using a pointed pipe driven into the ground—a technique that was both 
easier and sometimes more effective than the standard well-digging 
approach.111 Whether he had been the first to do so was a question open to 
much dispute, both at the time and later.112 After the war, Green formed a 
relationship with the pump- and well-supply company Cowing & Co., of 
Seneca Falls, New York, which manufactured driven-well equipment under the 
patent and became a major source of distribution.113 Many more wells were 
driven independently of Cowing or the patent. Thanks to its low cost and 
efficiency, the driven-well method spread rapidly in rural areas, with an 
estimated half-million or more such wells in use by the mid-1880s.114 
Green assigned half his rights to the New York pipe-and-boiler 
manufacturers William and George Andrews in 1871,115 and this group began a 
 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 229. 
108. The Clerk of the U.S. Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania certified that 
“not less than two thousand and fourteen suits ha[d] been brought” on the Roberts patent 
in that district. Motion To Advance Cause for Hearing at 3, Schreiber v. Roberts, No. 1027 
(C.C.W.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 1882). 
109. See Beedle v. Bennett, 122 U.S. 71, 75 (1887). 
110. Id. at 73-74.  
111. See Earl W. Hayter, The Western Farmers and the Drivewell Patent Controversy, 16 AGRIC. 
HIST. 16, 18-20 (1942).  
112. See, e.g., Eames v. Andrews, 122 U.S. 40, 63-69 (1887). 
113. Hayter, supra note 111, at 20-21. 
114. Eames, 122 U.S. at 48; Hayter, supra note 111, at 21.  
115. See Transcript of Record at 4, Eames, 122 U.S. 40 (No. 120). 
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vast campaign of patent assertion stretching from Long Island to Oregon.116 
The minimum license fee was ten dollars per well (equivalent to roughly two 
hundred dollars in 2014), collected either by agents of the Andrews brothers 
working on commission or, in some locations, by assignees who had acquired 
the patent right on a county-by-county basis.117 Predictably, resistance 
emerged, and it was met with large-scale litigation. How much is not clear, but 
the number of suits ran into the thousands. In some counties, as many as three 
hundred users were sued for refusing to take licenses.118 More than eight 
hundred driven-well suits were filed in the Northern District of New York in 
the year 1883 alone.119 Litigation on Green’s patent seems to have peaked in the 
late 1870s and early 1880s.120 Between 1883 and 1887, the agricultural historian 
Earl Hayter reported that “little actual litigation” took place—and yet Scientific 
American still estimated that some two thousand suits were pending in 1887.121 
The other great patent assertion effort against farmers was over barbed 
wire. The first patents for crude forms of barbed wire appeared in the 1860s, 
and in the early 1870s several Illinois inventors came up with practical designs 
that would form the basis of commercial-scale production.122 One of these men, 
J.F. Glidden, produced the form that would later become the pattern for most 
fencing wire.123 In 1876, Glidden assigned his share of the patent rights to the 
Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Company, of Massachusetts, which began a 
campaign of enforcement in 1876.124 Washburn & Moen targeted 
manufacturers, railroads, and individual farmers across the Midwest, 
principally in Iowa and in Illinois, where the invention was quickly becoming 
 
116. See Hayter, supra note 111, at 21-22, 22 n.36.  
117. Id. at 20-21; see also Chauncey Smith, A Century of Patent Law, 5 Q.J. ECON. 44, 59-60 (1890) 
(describing the enforcement strategy for patent violations related to driven wells). Again, 
present value is calculated according to an extended consumer price index. See Williamson, 
supra note 56. 
118. Hayter, supra note 111, at 22.  
119. Author’s Database, C.C.N.D.N.Y, supra note 12. 
120. Hayter, supra note 111, at 21-26. 
121. Id. at 22 n.36, 25. 
122. Earl W. Hayter, Barbed Wire Fencing—a Prairie Invention: Its Rise and Influence in the Western 
States, 13 AGRIC. HIST. 189, 190-91 (1939). 
123. Id. at 190. 
124. Id. at 191 n.11; Earl W. Hayter, An Iowa Farmers’ Protective Association: A Barbed Wire Patent 
Protest Movement, 37 IOWA J. HIST. & POL. 331, 334 (1939) [hereinafter Hayter, An Iowa 
Farmers’ Protective Association]. 
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an indispensable farming tool.125 The total number of suits filed on the barbed-
wire patents is unknown, but the strategy of mass patent assertion was highly 
visible. Congressman Nathaniel Deering of Iowa in 1879 cited a (likely 
overblown) newspaper report from Des Moines that “the attorneys for the 
patentee of the iron barbs for wire-fences are preparing . . . upward of four 
thousand cases in the Federal courts in our State.”126 
None of this is to say that high-volume patent litigation escaped more 
urban, industrial, and high-technology sectors. Between the 1840s and the 
1870s, litigation over railroad inventions was widespread, if never as prolific as 
the examples above. Here, the pattern of agrarian patent disputes was reversed: 
rather than organized enterprises pursuing small-scale infringers, railroad 
patent cases often involved individual inventors or independent equipment 
suppliers suing multiple railroad lines.127 Thanks to the midcentury 
proliferation of lines, including urban-district railroads, these suits could be 
quite numerous. In Philadelphia in 1860, for example, around twenty local 
railroad and streetcar companies and their various equipment suppliers 
collectively faced forty-eight suits under Richard Imlay’s carriage patent, John 
Lightner’s axle-box patent, and David Matthew’s spark-arrester grant.128 
Thomas Sayles, the owner of a clutch of important brake patents, brought suits 
against major lines across the country in the 1860s and 1870s.129 This type of 
litigation ebbed away in the 1880s, however, as lines consolidated and railroad 
companies organized into two giant collective defense associations, the Eastern 
Railroad Association and Western Railroad Association.130 These groupings 
used their members’ ever-deepening pockets to stave off or buy off threats.131  
Patent fights were also common in the new electrical industries of the late 
1870s and 1880s. Charles Brush and Thomas Edison in electric lighting, for 
example, and the Bell Telephone Company in telephony, brought frequent 
 
125. Hayter, An Iowa Farmers’ Protective Association, supra note 124, at 336-38; Joseph M. 
McFadden, Monopoly in Barbed Wire: The Formation of the American Steel and Wire Company, 
52 BUS. HIST. REV. 465, 466-70 (1978). 
126. 8 CONG. REC. 1,371 (1879) (statement of Rep. Deering). 
127. See STEVEN W. USSELMAN, REGULATING RAILROAD INNOVATION: BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY, 
AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1840-1920, at 104-08 (2002) (describing railroads’ willingness to 
defy “[o]utside inventors”); id. at 110 (describing suits against multiple lines by holders of 
key brake patents). 
128. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10. 
129. See Steven W. Usselman & Richard R. John, Patent Politics: Intellectual Property, the Railroad 
Industry, and the Problem of Monopoly, 18 J. POL’Y HIST. 96, 105-06 (2006). 
130. USSELMAN, supra note 127, at 114-17, 173-75. 
131. Id. 
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suits against rival inventors and their licensees.132 Bell Telephone, in particular, 
famously filed around six hundred suits under Alexander Graham Bell’s basic 
patents of 1876 and 1877.133 Patents were particularly central to the fledgling 
electrical industries because the pioneering companies were often organized 
around patent franchising: a patent holding company and/or equipment 
supplier, like the Edison Electric Light Company or American Bell, granted 
exclusive local licenses to promoters who established lighting networks and 
telephone exchanges.134 These licensees then had a strong interest in 
enforcement of the patents against their local (non-Edison and non-Bell) 
competitors, leading to waves of litigation as the pioneers of the industry 
fought for leadership in the field.  
C. The Dynamics of Mass Enforcement 
A few observations about the large-scale enforcement phenomenon are 
possible from this brief survey. First, the examples above, while only 
accounting for a tiny proportion of patentees and litigants, generated enough 
suits to have a substantial impact on the patent litigation system as a whole. 
Second, while this is admittedly an unsystematic sample of the highest-profile 
patent owners, some patterns emerge.  
One is that the nature of the patent holders as licensing entities is 
complicated—or at least does not readily map onto modern tropes about 
practicing and nonpracticing entities.135 Some of the patent owners were 
nonpracticing and devoted to assertion of their patents. The Woodworth 
planing machine syndicate falls into that category, as do Elias Howe,136 the 
Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company,137 Charles Goodyear,138 and perhaps 
 
132. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10; see also Lea Shaver, Illuminating Innovation: From Patent Racing to Patent War, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1891, 1915-21, 1926-33 (2012) (discussing Edison’s enforcement 
efforts). 
133. CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE PATENT 
THAT CHANGED AMERICA 12 (2015). 
134. Id. at 173-74; W. BERNARD CARLSON, INNOVATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS: ELIHU THOMSON 
AND THE RISE OF GENERAL ELECTRIC, 1870-1900, at 9-10 (1991). 
135. Cf. Michael Risch, Licensing Acquired Patents, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979, 988-99 (2014) 
(comparing some nineteenth-century patent owners to modern assertion entities, but 
suggesting that few such examples existed).  
136. Mossoff, supra note 80, at 207-08.  
137. AHRC, predecessor of the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company, did manufacture the 
patented compound for licensed distribution and sale to dentists. Goodyear v. Wait, 10 F. 
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Samuel Morse (though Morse was involved in promoting telegraph 
enterprises).139 Yet others were active manufacturers: Cyrus McCormick in 
reapers,140 Washburn & Moen in wire,141 and E.A.L. Roberts in well-blasting 
equipment.142 In the economic and organizational context of the nineteenth 
century, these patent owners’ mixed manufacturing and licensing strategies 
made considerable sense. Before the advent of big manufacturing firms at the 
end of the century, it was difficult for any supplier to satisfy the regional 
market for his product, let alone the national market. Any major patent holder 
would thus depend on licensing to take full advantage of the national scope of 
the right. Perhaps the surprise is that so many of these firms and inventors 
chose to be practicing entities as well. 
Another consideration prompted by modern concerns—and complicated by 
the historical setting—is the place of “end-user” suits in the patent litigation 
explosion. Much recent criticism has descended on the practice of asserting 
patents against large numbers of technology customers, rather than against 
their suppliers.143 So far, the commentary has assumed that this is a new 
phenomenon, “relatively rare” until our own patent-addled times.144 
Nineteenth-century mass enforcement shows otherwise. The farmer suits in 
particular would seem to be striking cases of end-user litigation, and were 
understood as such: farmers were presented by their defenders as “innocent 
purchasers” of patented articles, unwittingly caught up in a patent system 
designed for industrial entities.145 It was not unknown for patent holders to 
target downstream customers even where a suit against the supplier was 
available. For example, as part of its strategy to dissuade people from signing 
up for rival telephone services, the American Bell Telephone Company 
 
Cas. 729, 732 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 5,587). I have not found evidence of manufacturing 
activity by the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company. 
138. KORMAN, supra note 77, at 175-76 (describing contested accounts of Goodyear’s licensing 
revenue). 
139. JOHN, supra note 68, at 74-78. 
140. HOUNSHELL, supra note 62, at 154. 
141. Hayter, supra note 122, at 191 n.11.  
142. MCLAURIN, supra note 104, at 385-86. 
143. See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 
1451-52 (2014); Colleen Chien & Edward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being Sued 
En Masse for Patent Infringement and What Can Be Done, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 235, 235-36 
(2014).  
144. Chien & Reines, supra note 143, at 236. 
145. USSELMAN, supra note 127, at 148-49. 
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periodically chose to sue en masse the individual subscribers to infringing 
exchanges.146 
To some extent, though, the idea of a calculated “end-user” litigation 
strategy fits awkwardly in the nineteenth-century context. Widespread 
enforcement against individuals and small enterprises loomed large partly for 
the simple reason that most business operations consisted of individuals and 
small enterprises: the option of suing large manufacturers, retailers, or 
intermediaries was far less available than it would be today. Zebulon Parker’s 
suits targeted individual water-mill owners, for example, because no 
centralized suppliers of mill machinery existed in the 1840s.147 Woodworkers, 
dentists, and farmers were similarly small-scale and independent producers. 
Where infringing activities took place in an essentially artisanal economy, 
enforcement was bound to sweep in large numbers of individual defendants. 
On the other hand, in some ways the comparison stands. Large-scale 
litigation had the effect of stirring the public against particular patentees and 
against the patent system in general.148 And suits against small actors did have 
one natural resonance with today’s concerns about patent enforcement. Patent 
holders were well able to exploit the gap between their license demands and the 
cost of defending an infringement suit. This was especially true in the farmer 
suits, in Western states, and for any other accused infringer who lacked 
resources or was geographically distant from a federal court. As Iowa’s U.S. 
Senator Samuel G. Kirkwood explained: 
[A] patentee shall come along and say to each [farmer], “Sir, pay me so 
much a mile or so much a rod for the wire . . . or you must go to Des 
Moines . . . and defend a suit to be brought against you, the cost of 
which and the fees in which will in themselves be more than I demand 
of you.” . . . [O]ur people are paying day by day $10, $15, $20, when 
they do not know a particle more whether they owe the man a dollar or 
a cent . . . but paying the money just because it is cheaper to do it than 
to defend a suit.149  
Not all of the pressure for mass enforcement came from the plaintiffs’ side. 
One result of widespread litigation against individuals—and a fact that 
 
146. See, e.g., Thirty Seven Telephone Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1887, at 1 (describing suits against 
subscribers to infringing services in Elkhart and La Porte, Indiana). 
147. There were itinerant millwrights (essentially professional mill engineers for hire) who 
designed and installed water-wheel systems. They were craftsmen who operated on a 
relatively small scale. Layton, supra note 53, at 69.  
148. See infra Section III.C. 
149. Hayter, supra note 111, at 17 (third, fourth, and seventh alterations in original). 
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ultimately explains much of the volume of mass-enforcement filings—was 
collective patent defense. Almost all of the largest campaigns described above 
were characterized by organized opposition to the patent. Lumbermen and 
carpenters mobilized to defy the Woodworth interests.150 A United States 
dental protective union and a bevy of local dentists’ associations collected 
subscriptions to confront the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company.151 A 
“Producers’ Association” gathered oil-well owners against the Roberts patent 
and reportedly raised between forty thousand and sixty thousand dollars for 
the cause.152 Among farmers, antidrivewell associations raised funds and 
employed counsel to resist Nelson Green’s patent. In Michigan, the State 
Grange (the leading farmers’ organization) took over defense against the 
driven well.153 Iowa farmers formed the Farmers’ Protective Association to fight 
the barbed-wire patent.154 Not all defendants in mass patent enforcement 
campaigns were affiliated with defense associations, and not all much-litigated 
patents attracted a response of that kind. But the quantity and geographical 
distribution of large-scale litigation reflected in part the location of organized 
resistance. These were the places where accused infringers decided to fight 
rather than take licenses, and also the places where patent owners launched 
blanket litigation against individuals pour encourager les autres. 
As I will suggest below, the great patent campaigns would leave their mark 
on the law and politics of invention. But viewing patent litigation through its 
most visible events can give only a partial picture. To ground this account in a 
fuller description of the underlying patent litigation system, we have to turn to 
other sources. 
i i .  inside the patent l it igation explosion 
To explore the content of the patent litigation explosion, this Article turns 
to an untapped source: the archives of the federal courts. The archives contain 
the contemporaneous court records kept by the clerk of each court, which are 
now held at the National Archives’ regional facilities around the country. These 
records generally include the docket books in which case filings were recorded 
and in many instances preserve the actual documents filed with the court. The 
 
150. Cooper, supra note 38, at 313-16. 
151. A HISTORY OF DENTAL AND ORAL SCIENCE IN AMERICA 32 (J.E. Dexter ed., Philadelphia, 
Samuel S. White 1876).  
152. HENRY, supra note 102, at 543. 
153. Hayter, supra note 111, at 22. 
154. Hayter, An Iowa Farmers’ Protective Association, supra note 124, at 348. 
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retention rate of these materials is impressive: in the courts discussed below 
there is a surviving case file for almost every docketed case. Even so, individual 
case files vary in their contents. Some contain nothing more than a scrap of 
paper noting service of a subpoena or an appearance by a lawyer; others 
include bills of complaint, reports of examiners and special masters, 
handwritten transcripts of depositions, and even physical exhibits.155 Where 
available, this information can be used to build a picture of actual caseloads and 
the particular features of the parties and patents involved in litigation.  
Identifying patent suits from the mass of case files and dockets is no easy 
matter. Docket books rarely identified a case’s subject matter, and courts kept 
no internal statistics or indices for type of action. For the most part, finding 
and counting patent cases means trawling through every case file in the law 
and equity records of the U.S. circuit courts, the federal trial courts with 
jurisdiction over patent matters.156 “Read every case file” is dauntingly 
inefficient as a research method, especially when the documents in question are 
handwritten on fragile paper. It would be impractical for studying almost any 
other type of civil litigation in the nineteenth century. It is possible in the 
patent context only because the haystacks in question contain a lot of needles. 
In the leading jurisdictions, patent suits were one of the single largest 
categories of action before the circuit courts, and sometimes (particularly on 
the equity side of the court) completely dominated the caseload.157 Even so, the 
search process overall is extremely labor intensive. Trade-offs are inevitable; 
the only way to cover a significant chronological period is to sample particular 
courts in particular years. 
The data in this Part come from the archives of two very active courts: the 
U.S. Circuit Courts for the Southern District of New York, in New York City, 
and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Philadelphia. The sample from 
those courts amounts to a little over two thousand total cases filed in eight 
sample years: 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1910. These 
jurisdictions were chosen not because they were representative of litigation 
 
155. See, e.g., Hempel v. Obersteller, Frankenberg & Co., Equity Case No. 4-413 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
May 2, 1870) (on file with the National Archives at New York City) (containing a rubber-
coated diaper as an exhibit). 
156. For a description of the organization and jurisdiction of the circuit courts, see supra note 11 
and accompanying text.  
157. In the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, for example, patent suits made 
up between sixty percent and eighty-six percent of the equity cases in each of the sample 
years discussed below. Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra note 10. In the Circuit Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the number fluctuated between fifty-four percent 
and ninety-nine percent. The percentage of law cases that were patent matters was much 
lower, and in later years was negligible. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10. 
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activity generally, but because of the generally complete state of their archived 
records and their particular economic and legal importance. The Southern 
District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania were two of the 
leading patent jurisdictions. Their metropolitan centers, New York and 
Philadelphia, were two of the four largest cities in the United States 
throughout this period, together accounting for between two percent and seven 
percent of the country’s total population.158 New York and Pennsylvania were 
generally the top two states in terms of patents issued, and together accounted 
for a large share—between one-fifth and one-third—of all U.S. patents issued 
annually.159 Finally, the Southern District of New York and Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania were among the most heavily trafficked judicial districts in the 
nation. After the Department of Justice began collecting caseload statistics in 
the early 1870s, these districts together routinely accounted for between ten 
percent and fifteen percent of the nonadmiralty civil suits between private 
parties filed in the federal courts nationwide.160 
The two districts serve as microcosms in one sense. Both had extremely 
diverse economies—much more diverse, for example, than the industrial 
monocultures characteristic of New England manufacturing towns or the 
emerging economic specialization of Midwestern cities. New York was the 
premier city in both manufacturing and services, dominant in industries 
ranging from garment manufacturing to printing and publishing. Philadelphia 
and eastern Pennsylvania possessed a similarly varied economy, including 
heavy-industrial sectors such as steelmaking and locomotive building, as well 
as machine tools, textiles, clothing, brewing, sugar refining, furniture, 
chemicals, and farming. In 1909, Philadelphia reported manufacturing 
establishments in 211 of the Census Bureau’s 264 industry classifications, 
 
158. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT, supra 
note 25, at 1-28 to -29 tbl.Aa6-8; Campbell Gibson, Population of the 100 Largest Cities and 
Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 to 1990, tbls.7-14 (U.S. Census Bureau 
Population Div., Working Paper No. 27, 1998), http://www.census.gov/population/www 
/documentation/twps0027/twps0027.html [http://perma.cc/T6MN-QNYC].  
159. S. DOC. NO. 56-138, at iv (1901); S. MISC. DOC. NO. 51-58, at ix (1891); H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 
41-89, at 6-7 (1871); S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 36-7, at v-lxvii (1861); H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 31-32, at 
36-60 (1851); 1910 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS; 1880 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER 
PATENTS; Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., 
supra note 10. 
160. H.R. DOC. NO. 62-117, at 186 (1911); H.R. DOC. NO. 57-9, at 76-77 (1901); H.R. EXEC. DOC. 
NO. 52-7, at 28-29 (1891); S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 47-4, at 28-29 (1881); H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 43-
6, at 30-35 (1873); Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, 
C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra note 10. This number excludes admiralty cases, cases to which the 
United States was a party, and cases arising under federal bankruptcy law (for those years 
when such a thing existed).  
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second only to New York City’s 217 and well ahead of Boston’s 175 and 
Chicago’s 131.161 
These rough indicators of scale and diversity do not, of course, tell us 
whether the volume and/or composition of patent litigation in the Southern 
District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania can be extrapolated 
across the rest of the country. On the one hand, if patent disputes were driven 
in part by the scale and clustering of economic activity and innovation, then 
few places in the country could equal these districts. On the other hand, this 
was a polycentric industrial economy and there were many other 
manufacturing hubs: all of New England, upstate New York and western 
Pennsylvania, northern New Jersey, Baltimore and Washington, D.C., 
Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, and Cincinnati.162 And patent litigation also 
flourished outside urban centers, as described in Part I. While the Southern 
District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania both included 
agricultural counties within their boundaries, they missed out on much of the 
mass enforcement against farmers that took place in the Midwest.  
Fortunately, starting with these two districts has value either way: if they 
account for a large proportion of U.S. patent litigation, then the findings below 
tell us a lot about the overall patent litigation system; if they are only a small 
part of the national picture, then the scale of the litigation boom must have 
been genuinely huge. 
A. The Quantity of Litigation 
The Southern District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
sample provides the first opportunity to measure directly the quantity of patent 
litigation in the nineteenth-century courts. Figure 3 describes the number of 
suits filed in each of the sample years and the number of patents at issue in 
those suits. Table 1 compares these numbers to the total number of U.S. 
patents in force in each year. Broadly speaking, these data offer three 
perspectives on the quantity of patent litigation during the period.  
First, there was a late-nineteenth-century peak in the absolute volume of 
litigation in the two districts, followed by lower numbers of suits leading up to 
 
161. 9 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, TAKEN IN THE 
YEAR 1910: MANUFACTURES, 1909: REPORTS BY STATES, WITH STATISTICS FOR PRINCIPAL 
CITIES 265, 500, 815, 1052 (1912). 
162. See, e.g., CENSUS OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE ELEVENTH CENSUS: 1890, PART II: STATISTICS OF 
CITIES, at xxx-xxxiv (1895) (listing the manufacturing output for principal U.S. cities in 
1880 and 1890).  
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the turn of the century. As Figure 3 shows, more than 200 patent suits were 
filed in 1850 and 1860, and more than 300 in 1870, before the amount of 
litigation reached its highest in 1880, with 469 suits brought under 313 patents. 
The number of suits then fell back into the 200-250 range in 1890 and 1900, 
climbing over 300 again in 1910. Looking at the raw numbers alone gives a 
picture of a patent litigation explosion that arose before the Civil War and 
reached its height in the postwar years. 
Figure 3.  
patent litigation, southern district of new york and eastern district 
of pennsylvania, sample years 1840-1910163 
 
 
 
163.  Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
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Table 1.  
patent litigation, southern district of new york and eastern district 
of pennsylvania, sample years 1840-1910, relative to the total number 
of u.s. patents in force, and compared to suits in all u.s. districts in 
2013164 
 
 
Estimated Total 
U.S. Utility 
Patents in Force 
Suits in C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
and C.C.E.D. Pa. per 
1,000 U.S. Patents in 
Force 
Patents Litigated 
in C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
and C.C.E.D. Pa. 
per 1,000 in Force 
1840 7,074 5.9 2.1 
1850 7,571 30.0 3.8 
1860 22,294 9.0 2.6 
1870 84,828 4.0 2.4 
1880 186,235 2.5 1.7 
1890 283,800 0.7 0.5 
1900 369,887 0.7 0.5 
1910 455,701 0.8 0.6 
2013 (All U.S. 
Litigation) 
2,239,231 2.7 
(All Districts) 
2.2 
(All Districts) 
 
Second, the quantity of litigation presents a different trajectory when 
judged in relation to the size of the patent system (Table 1). Relative to the 
total estimated number of U.S. patents in force, the numbers of suits brought 
and individual patents litigated were highest in 1850. At that time, the 
explosive midcentury growth of patent issues was only just beginning, but the 
explosion in the number of suits was already well under way. During the 
second half of the century, the growth of litigation did not keep up with the 
 
164.  1836-1910 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS; OWEN BYRD & BRIAN HOWARD, LEX 
MACHINA, LEX MACHINA 2013 PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW, at i-ii (2014); 3 
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT, supra note 
25, at 3-426 to -27 tbl.Cg27-37; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY INDICATORS 83 (2013); Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s 
Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra note 10. Estimated numbers for 1840-1910 assume that all 
patents remained in force for the standard statutory fourteen- or seventeen-year term, 
adding where relevant the number of patents remaining in force under seven-year 
administrative extensions. The number of patents in force is given as of January 1 each year, 
except for the 2013 column, which shows patents in force at the end of 2012. 
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expansion of patenting, and the number of Southern District of New York and 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania suits per thousand U.S. patents trailed off, 
from thirty to less than one. The proportion of total U.S. patents that were 
involved in litigation in those districts slid less dramatically, from over 3.5 per 
thousand in force to around 0.5. As a matter of relative litigiousness, the patent 
explosion was at its height in midcentury. 
Third, as indicated to the right of Table 1, all of these numbers hold up in 
comparison to those at the peak of the modern patent litigation explosion. In 
2013, the record number of cases filed nationwide (6,092) represented 2.7 suits 
per thousand U.S. patents in force.165 That rate of litigation was exceeded in 
1840, 1850, 1860, 1870, and nearly matched in 1880 by suits filed in the 
Southern District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania alone. The 
amount of litigation per U.S. patent was fully ten times higher in those two 
districts by themselves in 1850 than it was across the whole country in 2013. In 
1890-1910 the numbers in these two districts were lower, but still high enough 
to suggest that the national rate of litigation exceeded that of today.166 Figure 4 
puts these rates in their long-run context by comparing the Southern District 
of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania sample years with a 
complete series of annual patent suit filings from 1923-2013, compiled by Ron 
Katznelson. 
 
165. BYRD & HOWARD, supra note 164, at i; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 164, at 
83. 
166. As long as the Southern District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania made up 
no more than a quarter of all patent suits filed nationwide in 1890-1910, the national rate of 
suits relative to patents in force would have exceeded 2013 levels. 
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Figure 4.  
rates of patent litigation per thousand u.s. patents in force, 
southern district of new york and eastern district of pennsylvania, 
sample years 1830-1910, and all u.s. districts, sample years 1923-2013 
(log scale on y-axis)167 
 
 
In terms of the proportion of patents litigated: the 4,917 patents on which 
suit was filed nationwide in 2013 represented 2.2 litigated patents per thousand 
in force.168 Filings in New York City and Philadelphia alone outstripped that 
pace in 1850, 1860, and 1870. The figures from these two districts again suggest 
that the national number would have comfortably cleared modern levels in 
1840 and 1880 and perhaps done so in 1890, 1900, and 1910 as well. The 
nineteenth-century patent litigation explosion was not just a matter of mass 
enforcement on a few patents; a historically high proportion of grants were 
litigated as well. 
 
167.  Katznelson, supra note 9; Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s 
Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra note 10. 
168. BYRD & HOWARD, supra note 164, at ii, 9; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 164, 
at 83. 
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B. Drivers of the Patent Litigation Explosion 
The Southern District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
data offer a wealth of information on the parties and patents involved in 
litigation. Three notable drivers of the litigation boom stand out from the 
sample: patent stretching, multiple litigation, and the changing organization of 
business activity. 
1. Patent Stretching 
The notion that patent holders commonly stretch their rights beyond the 
proper scope of their exclusive grant is a perennial complaint about the patent 
system. Patent interpretation and enforcement are rife with uncertainty, thanks 
to the limitations of claim drafting, the vagaries of judicial interpretation, and 
the presence of penumbral doctrines such as infringement by equivalents and 
functional claiming.169 The greater the uncertainty, the more litigation one 
would expect, and the more opportunities are available to patent owners to 
assert broad rights over a technology, including coverage of inventions and 
improvements far from the inventor’s original conception. These aspects of 
patent law have been repeatedly and persuasively identified as engines of 
litigation from the early nineteenth century to the software patents of the 
present day.170 
If the boundaries of patent rights are malleable today,171 they were all the 
more so in the nineteenth century. The very act of claiming one’s invention was 
open-ended. Modern patent law requires careful delineation of inventive scope 
in separately written claims, an approach known as “peripheral claiming” or 
“fence post” claiming, for its work in marking the outer limits of the right.172 
Nineteenth-century practice was characterized by a “central claiming” or “sign 
post” method, in which the description of the invention was read together with 
the claims to indicate the general nature of the protected invention and hence 
the scope of the patent, but those claims did not themselves define the 
 
169. BESSEN & MEURER, PATENT FAILURE, supra note 5, at 8-11. 
170. See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1853) (Campbell, J., dissenting) 
(charging that “[n]othing, in the administration of this law, will be more mischievous, more 
productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of exorbitant and unjust pretensions and 
vexations [sic] demands” than the doctrine of equivalents announced in the case); BESSEN & 
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE, supra note 5, at 8-11. 
171. See Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 895. 
172. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009). 
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peripheral boundaries of the patentee’s rights.173 The earliest patents possessed 
no claims at all in the modern sense, only a specification of the invention; the 
practice of adding claims as a textually separate statement appeared organically 
during the first decades of the nineteenth century before gaining statutory 
recognition in the 1836 Patent Act.174 Yet even with the claiming requirement in 
place, questions of scope and infringement were still not resolved solely, or 
even primarily, with reference to the text of the claim. Instead they were 
determined by comparing the accused infringing product to the invention 
described in the patent.175 Stricter peripheral claiming gained growing official 
sanction in the later part of the century, especially from the 1870s onwards,176 
but its adoption was gradual and its hold incomplete.177 In addition, judicial 
construction of patent scope contained its own degree of explicit flexibility. It 
was common at midcentury for judges to invoke “canons of liberal 
construction” toward patentees in the interpretation of patents.178 Various 
doctrines embraced liberality, including the understanding that, when 
interpreting the patent from its specification and claims, the scope of the grant 
should extend to equivalents of the specific embodiment described.179 
It is plausible that there were tides in judicial attitudes toward the scope of 
patents that help to account for the swell and ebb of litigation. Indeed, a prima 
facie case might be made from the conventional chronology, which has liberal 
 
173. See id. at 1766-70; William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 
46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 760 (1948) (“[T]he courts for a long time did not regard the particular 
formulations chosen by the inventor to express his claim and distinguish his invention from 
the prior art as the definitive measure of the scope of the patent.”).  
174. See, e.g., Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134, 134-43 
(1938). 
175. Id. at 472-74. 
176. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 731-35 (2009); 
Lutz, supra note 174, at 487-88 (noting the adoption after 1870 of Patent Office rules 
requiring greater specificity in claiming). 
177. See John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive Community”: A 
Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 348-63 (2008) 
(documenting “[t]he [s]low [e]volution of [m]odern [c]laims and [c]laim 
[i]nterpretation”); Woodward, supra note 173, at 760-64 (reviewing decisions from the late 
nineteenth century that continued to deemphasize the text of the claim). 
178. See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the 
Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 998-1001 (2007).  
179. See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343-44 (1853); see also Joshua Sarnoff, 
The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the Future, Part I (1790-1870), 
87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 395-96 (2005) (discussing Winans). Another 
example—this one narrowing patent scope—was the principle that patents should be 
construed narrowly to save their validity. See, e.g., Turrill v. Mich. S. & C. R.R. Co., 68 U.S. 
(1 Wall.) 491, 510 (1863). 
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claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents emerging by the 1850s and 
stricter peripheral claiming taking hold in the late nineteenth century.180 
However, there are reasons to be wary about attributing wider patterns of 
litigation to any particular doctrine of claim construction, still less to any 
purported clear trend toward generosity or strictness over time. For one thing, 
patent law was seen by its most expert participants as a branch of law that 
defied clear ordering. George Ticknor Curtis, the leading treatise writer of the 
1850s and 1860s, admitted that “the Patent Law admits of less reduction to 
precise rules and axioms, than any other branch of jurisprudence,” with the 
case specificity of judicial decisions meaning that “a precise rule is rarely  
to be eliminated from them.”181 Furthermore, the courts were persistently  
split over questions of broad and narrow construction.182 Some of the  
doctrinal constructs at the heart of claim breadth, such as the boundary 
between a “principle,” a “process,” and an unpatentable abstract idea, remained 
thoroughly slippery throughout the second half of the century.183 Finally, the 
shift to peripheral claiming was gradual and partial, with countervailing 
doctrines surviving alongside it.184 Tempting though it might be to pick on 
subsequently famous waypoints of patent jurisprudence as facilitators of the 
litigation boom, using such markers in hindsight may radically overstate the 
coherence of nineteenth-century patent doctrine. 
By contrast, there are some highly visible practices of patent stretching 
whose rise and fall coincide strikingly with the litigation explosion. During that 
period, litigated patents were persistently expanded in two ways: temporally, 
through term extension, and textually, by reissue. As Figure 5 shows, more 
 
180. Burk & Lemley, supra note 172, at 1769-70.  
181. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at x (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1st ed. 
1849). 
182. See Lutz, supra note 174, at 470-71 (describing divergent decisions in the 1870s); infra text 
accompanying notes 270-275 (describing divisions on the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1850s).  
183. Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual Property 448-88 
(June 2005) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with author). 
184. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and 
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 13-18 (2014). In 
addition to the continuing viability of infringement by equivalents, the patent law of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries embraced the concept of the “pioneer patent,” 
which received a broad construction on account of the technological significance of the 
invention. See, e.g., William K. Townsend, Patents, 1701-1901, in TWO CENTURIES’ GROWTH 
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1701-1901, at 391, 406 (Members of the Faculty of the Yale Law Sch. eds. 
1901) (“The first inquiry is whether the patent is a primary one; that is, for a pioneer 
invention . . . . In the case of a primary patent greater liberality is shown in construing its 
claims so as to protect it against equivalents . . . .”).  
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than two-thirds of suits in the 1850 sample involved a patent that had received 
at least one seven-year term extension either by act of Congress or from the 
board of executive branch officials (or, after 1848, from the Commissioner of 
Patents) empowered to grant such petitions. More than a third of the suits in 
1860 and 1870 involved patents that had similarly been extended. These 
patents were always a minority, even among litigated grants: in no year 
sampled here did they exceed fifteen percent of the patents in suit. But they 
were predictable litigation magnets because of the rents they could extract from 
more mature technologies and because of the relatively greater interest in 
resisting them as a result.  
Figure 5.  
percent of suits involving extended and reissued patents, southern 
district of new york and eastern district of pennsylvania, sample 
years 1840-1910185 
 
 
Extensions were a notable aspect of patent management for several decades 
in the middle of the nineteenth century. Although extended patents made their 
greatest litigation impact at the beginning of the Southern District of New 
York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania sample, extension practice actually 
 
185.  Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
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reached its peak in the third quarter of the century. Famous examples like 
Woodworth and Blanchard aside, few expiring patents were extended before 
the 1850s. Between 1836 and 1851 only thirty-eight patents were extended by 
the Patent Office board and only a handful by Congress.186 Generally, fewer 
than 1% of expiring patents received an additional term, and between 1844 and 
1848, fewer than 20% of applications for an administrative extension were 
approved.187 After the Commissioner of Patents gained sole authority to grant 
extensions in 1848, the approval rate rose above 50%.188 By the late 1850s the 
doors had been flung open: between 1857 and 1877, around 80% of extension 
applications were approved. Many more patents were extended in that period: 
often around 5% to 8%, and sometimes as high as 11%, of the patents expiring 
each year.189 Over two hundred extensions per year were granted in 1872 and 
1873.190 The welter of extensions came to an abrupt end soon thereafter, 
though, because the Patent Act of 1861 abolished administrative extensions for 
all grants made after that date.191 The Commissioner of Patents granted the last 
extension in 1877.192 After 1880 no suits on extended patents appear in the 
Southern District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania sample.193 
The blossoming of term extensions between the 1850s and mid-1870s 
reflected the emergence of a highly solicitous attitude at the Patent Office. 
During the 1840s, the Office had drawn its nascent examining staff from a 
cadre of accomplished “scientific men” who, for a time, imposed strict 
standards of examination.194 This cohort proved notably stingy in granting 
patent applications; even as the number of applications took off around 
midcentury, the rate of approval rarely crept above fifty percent.195 Under 
pressure from a growing patentees’ lobby of inventors and patent agents, 
 
186. 1844-1851 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS. The 1844 report states that seven extensions 
were granted by that date. 1844 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS. 
187. 1844-1848 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS. 
188. 1849-1851 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS. 
189. 1857-1877 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS. The reports for 1854-1856 do not give 
numbers of extensions applied for or granted. 
190. 1872-1873 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS.  
191. Patent Act of 1861, ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 246, 249.  
192. See 1877-1881 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS. 
193. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
194. See Robert C. Post, “Liberalizers” Versus “Scientific Men” in the Antebellum Patent Office, 17 
TECH. & CULTURE 24, 31-33, 38-39 (1976) (describing the scientific accomplishments of this 
cohort).  
195. Id. at 32.  
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however, the Office began to relent and embrace “liberalization.”196 Charles 
Mason, who served as Commissioner of Patents from 1853 to 1857, noted with 
satisfaction that 
[n]o small change has certainly been introduced since I have been at the 
head of the office. Some persons may doubt the propriety of allowing 
so large a proportion of patents. I am satisfied, however, that a liberal 
policy in this respect towards inventors is the right policy and most in 
accordance with the intention of the patent law.197 
Mason’s successor, Joseph Holt, was still more patentee friendly. In one of his 
early decisions as Commissioner, Holt announced that the Office should find 
itself “taking [inventors] by the hand, as the benefactors of their race, and 
strewing, if possible, their pathway with sunshine and with flowers.”198 
Arriving as the appointee of incoming President Buchanan, Holt purged the 
old guard of examiners and replaced them with party men who proved much 
more receptive to inventors’ interests.199 The new philosophy generally held 
through successive changes in leadership and administration, and the Patent 
Office did not revert to its erstwhile skepticism during the decades that 
followed.200  
Extensions were not the only Patent Office-controlled practice that 
flourished beginning in the 1850s. In addition to the prevalence of extended 
patents, around half of the suits filed in 1860, 1870, and 1880 included at least 
one reissued patent (Figure 5). Reissues were much more common than 
extensions: more than a third of the unique patents in those three sample years 
had been reissued at some point before litigation,201 and the Patent Office 
approved hundreds of reissues each year during the relevant decades.202 
Seeking a reissue during that period appears to have been a fairly standard 
tactic for patentees preparing for litigation.  
 
196. Id. at 32-35, 39-42, 46-47.  
197. Charles Mason, Diary Entry (June 15, 1855), in 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF CHARLES MASON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE OF IOWA, 1804-1882, at 138 (Charles Mason Remey ed., 1939); see also Post, 
supra note 194, at 47-48 (describing Mason’s tenure as Commissioner). 
198. J. Holt, Commissioner Holt’s Decision, SCI. AM., Nov. 14, 1857, at 78. 
199. Post, supra note 194, at 48-51. 
200. Id. at 52.  
201. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
202. Reissue grants rose from a few dozen a year before 1857 to an average of over 500 annually 
in the 1870s, before falling dramatically in the 1880s. 1850-1890 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER 
PATENTS. 
 the first patent litigation explosion 
889 
 
There are a number of reasons why this phenomenon would be expected to 
increase the number of suits. One is the aggravated uncertainty involved: 
parties wishing to operate a potentially patented technology had to contend not 
only with the original specification and claims, but also with reissued versions 
and with the potential of further reissues in the future. At a time when the 
information flows of the patent system were still developing, the problems of 
public notice created by constantly changing patents were acute.203 
Moreover, applicants presumably sought reissues because they 
strengthened the hand of the patentee, either as to scope or validity. Evidence 
suggests that broadened claim scope was the prize frequently sought and 
sometimes obtained by patent owners.204 Teasing out the scope effects of claim 
amendments on a case-by-case, invention-by-invention basis for a large 
number of patents is prohibitively difficult, but some of the most famous 
patents suggest a blueprint. Charles Goodyear’s much-litigated 1844 patent for 
the process of vulcanizing rubber provides one example. By 1848, commercial 
rubber could be made by methods that fell outside the terms of Goodyear’s 
claim, but the inventor’s backers persuaded him to obtain a reissue that 
claimed in more abstract terms the application of heat in the curing process, 
and thus his patent continued to cover the later methods.205 In 1860, a further 
reissue granted to Goodyear’s heir added a product claim for “the new 
manufacture called ‘vulcanized india-rubber,’” allowing the patentee to cover 
rubber goods directly rather than just the process of manufacture.206 At around 
 
203. On the flow of patent information in the nineteenth century, see Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, 
supra note 31. 
204. But see Lutz, supra note 174, at 152 (noting that during a “formative period” of claiming 
practice in the 1840s, “patents were often criticized [i.e., their validity was questioned] by 
the courts for failure to clearly point out the invention, whereupon the patents were reissued 
with more definite claims”); id. at 146 (describing a reissue following a judicial finding that 
the patent in question was invalid as asserted). 
205. Goodyear had originally claimed “[t]he combining of the said gum with sulphur and with 
white lead, so as to form a triple compound,” adding a dependent claim for “the process of 
exposing [the compound] to the action of a high degree of heat” to achieve vulcanization. 
U.S. Patent No. 3,633 (issued June 15, 1844). By 1848, commercial rubber could be made 
with rubber and sulfur only, omitting Goodyear’s white lead. The reissued patent claimed 
“[t]he curing of caoutchouc or india-rubber by subjecting it to the action of a high degree of 
artificial heat, substantially as herein described, and for the purpose specified,” adding a 
second claim for “the preparing and curing of the compound of india-rubber, sulphur and a 
carbonate or other salt or oxide of lead, by subjecting the same to the action of artificial heat, 
substantially as herein described.” U.S. Patent No. RE156 (issued Dec. 25, 1849); see also 
Guise-Richardson, supra note 74, at 377-78 (outlining the purposes of the reissue and the 
role of Goodyear’s investors). 
206. U.S. Patent No. RE1,084 (issued Nov. 20, 1860); Kendall J. Dood, Pursuing the Essence of 
Inventions: Reissuing Patents in the 19th Century, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 999, 1002 (1991). 
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the same time that Goodyear received his first reissue, Samuel Morse received 
the second reissue of his basic telegraph patent, and it was this version that 
included what became his broadest and most famous claim: to “the use of the 
motive power of the electric or galvanic current . . . however developed for 
marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any 
distances . . . .”207 
Reissues appealed to those who acquired patents as well as to inventor-
owners. Former Commissioner of Patents Charles Mason, for example, 
followed his tenure in the office with a career as a prominent patent lawyer 
who periodically acquired an interest in promising grants.208 In 1876, Mason 
noted in his diary that he had been  
all day engaged in writing a specification in the case of Stephen Hull  
for the reissue of the patent in which we have a one half interest. I  
think we shall be so able to shape the patent and the claims as to  
subordinate most of the harvesting machines that are made in the 
United States . . . .209  
On another occasion, Mason recorded his acquisition of a stake in the Atkins 
reaper patent. “It is a very ingenious invention, and led off into a new field of 
discovery,” Mason wrote, “[b]ut the patent was not what it ought to have 
been, and it has proved of very little advantage to the owner. We are to have 
one-half the patent for taking out the re-issue, and I hope to make it of value to 
us.”210 
Even among patent lawyers, these practices seemed to reach untenable 
levels. Hubert Howson, one of Philadelphia’s (and the country’s) leading 
patent attorneys, wrote in 1878 of the “patent speculator,” who 
takes an excursion to Washington, probably takes the advice of a 
solicitor there, to whom he explains what he wants, and together they 
go on a hunting expedition through the records and model halls, until 
they find some model of a patent which they think can be doctored by 
reissue to resemble a subsequent prominent patent . . . . A lot of these 
speculators, lawyers and patent solicitors sometimes among them, club 
 
207. U.S. Patent No. RE117 (issued June 13, 1848); Mossoff, supra note 73, at 9. 
208. See KENNETH W. DOBYNS, THE PATENT OFFICE PONY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT 
OFFICE 156-64 (1997).  
209. Charles Mason, Diary Entry (Apr. 20, 1876) (on file with the Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Charles Mason Remey Family Papers, Box 17).  
210. Charles Mason, Diary Entry (Dec. 28, 1863), in 5 LIFE AND LETTERS OF CHARLES MASON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE OF IOWA, 1804-1882, supra note 197, at 741. 
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together to buy up a patent or patents relating to something in general 
use in different parts of the country, subject their purchases to the 
reissuing process, establish headquarters, and, with a great flourish, 
proceed to levy on manufacturers who were ignorant of the existence of 
the patent which has been reissued, and which would doubtless have 
been forgotten, but for the keen eyes of these speculators.211 
The heavy litigation of reissued patents reflected both the strengths and the 
weaknesses of such grants. On the one hand, the courts and the Patent Office 
in the mid-nineteenth century seem to have readily allowed broadening 
reissues and thus enabled patentees to enforce excessively powerful rights. As a 
contemporary observer noted,  
For years it had been the accepted rule that the statutory provisions 
concerning reissues were to be liberally construed, so as to insure to the 
inventor the full enjoyment of his discovery. They were held to be 
intended to provide for the correction of whatever stood in the way of 
the broadest equity.212 
On the other hand, changes in the law of reissues in the 1870s and early 
1880s created growing incentives to litigate on the defendants’ side. During 
that period, the courts began to apply greater scrutiny to the validity of 
reissues. A string of decisions in the 1870s began to rein in reissue practice and 
to cast doubt on broadened grants.213 By 1880, the Supreme Court’s disfavor 
was clear. Writing for a unanimous Court in a water wheel case, Justice 
Bradley assailed the apparently widespread practice of reissue abuse: 
[A] change comes over the scene: the patent becomes the property of a 
corporation that manufactures wheels, a monopoly of the business is 
very desirable . . . . The usual remedy in such cases is resorted to. A 
reissue of the patent is sought, with expanded claims, sufficiently 
general and comprehensive to embrace a wide monopoly of structure, 
and to shut up competing establishments. In this way the patent laws 
have been made the instruments of great injustice and oppression. The 
 
211. H. HOWSON, PATENTS AND THE USEFUL ARTS 117-18 (1878). 
212. Rowland Cox, Reissued Patents.—the Position of the Supreme Court, 15 AM. L. REV. 731, 731 
(1881). 
213. Id. at 732-36; Dood, supra note 206, at 1015-16 (1991). 
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real object and design of a reissue of a patent have been abused and 
subverted.214 
In this new climate of judicial hostility to reissued grants, accused 
infringers may have been more willing to fight infringement cases on now-
vulnerable reissued patents rather than submit to licenses. Two years later, in 
Miller v. Brass Co., the Court held that a broadening reissue obtained after an 
unreasonable delay (for which the rule of thumb was two years) “may justly be 
declared illegal and void.”215 Patentees evidently got the message: the number 
of applications for reissue received by the Patent Office fell from over six 
hundred per year in the late 1870s to under two hundred by 1884 and under 
one hundred by 1887.216 By the end of the decade, patent owners appeared 
reluctant to bring reissued grants into court: only four percent of litigated 
patents in the 1890 Southern District of New York and Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania sample had been reissued, accounting for only five percent of 
suits in that year.217 
Overall, the combination of extensions and reissues suggests that the 
patent litigation wave included many instances where patent holders were 
pursuing, rather than leading, the spread of the technology in question. Older 
patents were revived and frequently redrafted to extract rents from users of 
inventions that had already been diffused widely. The age of patents in 
litigation gives a good guide to the midcentury prevalence and later decline of 
these practices. The median suit by age in the 1850 sample involved a patent 
that was over twenty years old (Figure 6), at a time when the nominal term of a 
patent was just fourteen years.218 With the demise of extensions and reissues 
after 1880, the pattern of old patents deployed against established technologies 
faded. By 1910, the median suit involved a patent that was little over five years 
old. 
 
214. Mfg. Co. v. Ladd, 102 U.S. 408, 411 (1880). 
215. 104 U.S. 350, 355 (1882). 
216. See 1887 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS, at xiv; 1884 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER 
PATENTS, at iv; 1879 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS, at iii. 
217. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
218. This result was due to the large number of suits filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
on the extended Parker water wheel patent. For the history of this extended grant, see supra 
notes 33-41 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 6.  
age in years of patent in the median suit, southern district of new 
york and eastern district of pennsylvania, sample years 1840-1910219 
 
 
While this pattern may appear suspect, we should be careful about 
applying hasty normative judgments to the practices involved in this situation. 
The informational problems involved in monitoring potentially infringing 
activity in nineteenth-century America were huge, especially across large 
distances. If patentees were often catching up relatively late with unknowing 
users and established markets, that should not be surprising or indeed evidence 
of gamesmanship. Likewise, what I have described as patent stretching was not 
necessarily mere opportunism. Patents that were extended and/or reissued may 
simply have been among the most valuable patents, and hence the most 
pirated. The fact that they were overrepresented in litigation does not 
automatically signal illegitimate practices by patentees. Moreover, taken at face 
value, the provisions for term extension and reissue contained explicit 
limitations meant to prevent abuse, and these were not total dead letters: some 
applications for extension were denied, and some reissued patents were struck 
down by the courts for impermissible broadening of scope.220 
 
219.  Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
220. See L.D. Underwood, Certain Phases of Reissues, Particularly Delay in Filing the Application, 
and Inadvertence, Accident, or Mistake, 4 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 564, 567-69 (1921) (describing 
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All that said, the heavy use of both extension and reissue, the details of 
particular high-profile cases, the constant refrains of contemporary 
commentators, and the rapid decline in reissue practice after courts cracked 
down on broadening reissues do all suggest that these patent-stretching tools 
had become both a driver of litigation and a subject of abuse. The Southern 
District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania sample of suits in 
1890-1910 contains no extended patents and only a handful of reissued grants; 
those years also saw a significantly lower rate of litigation relative to the 
number of U.S. patents in force. Cleaning up the practices of patent stretching 
likely played at least some part in dousing the litigation explosion. 
2. Multiple Litigation and Mass Enforcement 
Patent stretching did not take place in isolation. Much of the rise and fall of 
the litigation explosion may be explained by another set of litigation practices. 
As suggested by the survey of national campaigns in Part I, it is clear that 
repeat suits by certain patent owners went a long way toward driving 
quantitative trends in nineteenth-century patent litigation. This was especially 
true in the early part of the period sampled here. In 1850, just twenty-nine 
plaintiffs brought the 227 suits filed in the Southern District of New York and 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In later years the ratio was not as dramatic, 
but multiple litigation still accounted for a large share of all suits. Across the 
whole sample, nearly three-quarters of plaintiffs appearing brought only a 
single suit, while the twenty-nine plaintiffs filing the most suits accounted for a 
third of all the litigation (Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
Patent Office rules governing reissue practice); supra notes 186-191 and accompanying text 
(describing extension approval rates and courts’ invalidation of reissued patents).  
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Table 2.  
proportion of plaintiffs filing multiple suits, southern district of 
new york and eastern district of pennsylvania, sample years 1840-
1910221 
Number of 
Plaintiffs Filing 
Number of 
Plaintiffs 
Percent of All 
Plaintiffs 
Number of 
Suits 
Percent of 
Total Suits 
1 Suit 618 71% 618 30% 
2-4 Suits 177 20% 465 22% 
5-9 Suits 46 5% 301 14% 
10+ Suits 29 3% 697 33% 
 
The dataset almost certainly understates the incidence and scale of multiple 
litigation in this period. Major enforcement campaigns were lumpy, typically 
producing sudden bursts of litigation spread across two, three, or more 
adjacent years, meaning that sampling at decade intervals often captures only a 
slice of any given effort. For example, sixty-five suits brought by the Goodyear 
Dental Vulcanite Company appear in the sample years, but the company’s 
overall footprint was still larger: docket entries show that it brought more than 
400 suits in Philadelphia alone between 1867 and 1880.222 In addition, such 
campaigns regularly spanned several states, so that what appear to be isolated 
suits in the sample were in fact part of larger operations. Thomas Blanchard, 
for example, appears here as a one-off plaintiff with a single suit in New York 
in 1850, when he was actually one of the more prolific patent enforcers of his 
generation.223 
Even so, some of the mass enforcement of the age is captured by the 
sample. The plaintiffs appearing most frequently (Table 3) are familiar from 
the survey of large-scale litigation in Part I. 
 
221.  Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
222. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10. 
223. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
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Table 3. 
most frequent plaintiffs, southern district of new york and eastern 
district of pennsylvania, sample years 1840-1910224 
Plaintiffs Suits Filed 
Location of 
Plaintiff Industry 
Years 
Appearing 
Oliver H.P. Parker 150 Philadelphia, PA Water Power 1850 
Goodyear Dental  
Vulcanite Co. 65 New York, NY Dental Rubber 1870, 1880 
Charles Goodyear, Joined 
by Various Licensees 49 Connecticut Rubber Goods 1850, 1860 
American Bell Telephone 
Co. (with Local Licensees) 36 Boston, MA Telephones 1880, 1890 
George H. Wooster 33 New York, NY Garments 1880 
Farbenfabriken of  
Elberfeld Co. 26 New York, NY Pharmaceuticals 1900, 1910 
George C. Roberts 21 New York, NY Refrigeration 1870 
Columbia Motor Car Co.  
& George B. Selden 20 
Hartford, CT & 
Rochester, NY Automobiles 1910 
George Gregerson, 
Assignee of John Lightner 20 Roxbury, MA 
Railroad 
Equipment 1860 
Richard Imlay 20 New York, NY Railroad Equipment 1860 
Cimiotti Unhairing Co.  
& John W. Sutton 19 New York, NY Garments (Fur) 1900 
Benjamin Urner, Trustee 
of George B. Arnold 18 New York, NY 
Sewing  
Machines 1880 
Edward M. Lowden & 
John Carr 17 Philadelphia, PA Lamps 1880 
Panayiotis Panoulias 16 New York, NY Food (Candy) 1910 
Samuel Bernstein 16 New York, NY Textiles 1880 
Jehyleman Shaw 15 Bridgeport, CT Photography 1870 
John Brown 15 Stonington, CT Ship Design 1850 
 
 
 
 
224. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
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Oliver H.P. Parker (the Pennsylvania assignee of the Parker water wheel 
patent), the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company, Charles Goodyear, and 
American Bell were all engaged in national campaigns. These four plaintiffs 
collectively accounted for around fifteen percent of all the suits in the Southern 
District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania sample. Beneath 
them, however, were a variety of other multiple litigants across a wide range of 
industries. The repeat-litigation pattern seems to have been a broad-based one.  
If multiple litigation had a large impact on the aggregate number of suits, 
then what explains the frequency of such repeat enforcement? One way to get 
at this question is to look at the characteristics of the most- and least-litigated 
patents. Table 4 describes two groups: “high-volume” patents, meaning those 
appearing in ten or more suits in the sample, and “single-suit” patents that 
were litigated only once in the sample years. The former group is relatively 
small, comprising just thirty-nine patents, but accounts for a large share of the 
overall litigation in the sample.  
At least two areas of systematic difference are visible between the two 
populations. First, multiple litigation during the boom was closely associated 
with practices of patent stretching. For as long as term extensions were 
available, the patents in the high-volume category were much more likely to 
have been extended than were the single-suit patents. A significant fraction of 
the single-suit patents had been reissued before litigation—around twenty-five 
percent to thirty-five percent in the 1840-1880 samples—but again, the high-
volume patents were generally more likely to have been reissued. Overall, it 
was the high-volume group that accounted for the pattern, discussed above, of 
older patents being asserted over established technologies. The average age of 
once-litigated grants generally remained in the five- to seven-year range, while 
the average age of the high-volume patents stood at over ten years through 
1890, before converging with that of the single-suit population in 1900 and 
1910. 
 
 
 
 
 the yale law journal 	 125 :848   20 16  
898 
 
Table 4. 
characteristics of the most- and least- litigated patents, southern 
district of new york and eastern district of pennsylvania, sample 
years 1840-1910225 
  1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 
Number of 
Patents 
High Volume 
(10+) 0 4 6 3 11 4 3 8 
Single Suit 8 10 29 156 231 127 143 235 
Percent of All 
Litigations in 
Sample Year 
High Volume 
(10+) n/a 77% 57% 24% 23% 25% 9% 19% 
Single Suit 19% 5% 15% 39% 37% 48% 49% 52% 
Percent 
Extended 
High Volume 
(10+) n/a 50% 33% 67% 18% 0% 0% 0% 
Single Suit 0% 10% 0% 10% 3% 0% 0% 0% 
Percent 
Reissued 
High Volume 
(10+) n/a 25% 50% 100% 55% 0% 0% 0% 
Single Suit 25% 30% 34% 29% 34% 3% 1% 5% 
Average Age of 
Patent at First 
Suit in Years 
High Volume 
(10+) n/a 11.6 13.8 13.8 10.5 10.1 7.1 6.7 
Single Suit 5.3 6.6 3.4 5.7 7.2 5.9 7.0 5.8 
 
Second, high-volume patent litigation seems to have reflected particular 
enforcement strategies. As with the nationwide mass-enforcement campaigns 
discussed in Part I, the sample high-volume patents suggest a tendency toward 
“end-user” litigation—that is, large numbers of suits directed against 
downstream users of the patented item, rather than against larger 
manufacturers or other intermediaries. Suits brought on high-volume patents 
were generally more likely than single-suit patent cases to name individuals as 
defendants, rather than naming partnerships or corporations (Figure 7). Case 
titles are an imperfect measure of defendants’ end-user or small-entity status—
named individuals could be officers or agents of companies, for example—but 
 
225.  Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. The term “litigations” counts every patent every time it was involved in suit. 
Because some suits involved more than one patent, this number is higher than the number 
of suits filed. 
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the most active litigants in the sample did indeed sue small-scale users. Oliver 
Parker sued individual millers and millwrights; the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite 
Company targeted dentists; American Bell sued users of infringing telephones 
and drugstore owners who provided pay-telephone services to the public. 
Further down the list of the most prolific plaintiffs: refrigerator-patent owner 
George C. Roberts sued infringing butchers; photography patentee Jehyleman 
Shaw sued individual photographers.226 
Figure 7. 
percent of patent litigations on high-volume and single-suit patents 
that named only individuals as defendants, southern district of 
new york and eastern district of pennsylvania, sample years 1840-
1910227 
 
 
Two years in the sample presented an exception to this pattern of 
divergence between the high- and low-litigation patent groups. One anomaly 
occurred in 1860: that year saw a much higher rate of high-volume patent suits 
 
226. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
227.  Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. The term “high-volume” patents refers to those litigated ten or more times in the 
Southern District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania sample years (Table 4). 
No high-volume patents appeared in the 1840 sample year. 
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against companies, as a result of two patent owners suing clusters of railroad 
companies in Philadelphia. That episode serves as a reminder that multiple 
litigation against larger and more deep-pocketed infringers was a possibility, 
although it was less widespread at that time than downstream litigation against 
smaller users. 1910 presented a different situation. In that year, the two groups’ 
respective rates of litigation naming individuals were almost identical at under 
twenty percent. End-user litigation had waned across the board by this point, 
and the most-litigated patents were now no more likely to target individuals 
than the least-litigated patents.  
Distinguishing between repeatedly litigated and seldom-litigated patents 
highlights both differences within the patent litigation system and change over 
time. The most-litigated grants up until 1880—that is, during the height of the 
boom—were qualitatively different from the bulk of litigated patents. They 
represented maximum exploitation of the patent-stretching tools available as 
well as highly aggressive strategies of public enforcement. To the extent that 
multiple litigation powered the patent litigation explosion, that explosion 
clearly grew in part from the law’s willingness to provide expansive (and often 
self-expanding) patent rights. Conversely, the explosion ebbed when extension 
and reissue were curbed. By 1900 and especially by 1910, the patents involved 
in multiple litigation looked a lot more like those enforced only once in the 
sample: they were of similar age and were enforced against individuals and 
companies at more similar rates.  
Why the practical strategy of mass enforcement flourished in midcentury 
and then diminished after the 1880s is a separate and more opaque question. 
Explaining why mass suits against small-scale infringers constituted an 
appealing enforcement strategy must turn in part on the business models of the 
patent holders that conducted that type of litigation. Unfortunately, it is 
unclear exactly why, or to what extent, suing small entities was profitable in 
and of itself. Data on monetary awards are spotty in the circuit court dockets 
and case files, and information about aggregate licensing revenues, either in 
litigation filings or elsewhere, is rare. Any changes in the financial return on 
suing, for example, hundreds of farm households, remain a little mysterious. 
That leaves two more visible explanations for why the mass-enforcement 
model flourished. One, as mentioned in Section II.C,228 is that litigation in the 
federal circuit courts was relatively cheap for patentees and relatively expensive 
for some defendants, thus establishing a balance of power that was crucial to 
the patentees’ principal aim of selling licenses. As U.S. Senator William 
Windom of Minnesota explained,  
 
228. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  
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[B]y the authority of the United States you may go to the capital of a 
State and for a claim of $5 each you may send the United States marshal 
to a thousand men, or ten thousand . . . and compel them to travel 
hundreds of miles to defend against your claim, or, as more frequently 
occurs, to pay an unjust demand as the cheapest way of meeting it.229  
This problem of distance was by no means an issue peculiar to patent law, but 
was a characteristic feature of litigation in the federal courts in the nineteenth 
century. Railroads fought for decades to remove accident cases and other 
conflicts with the general public to federal jurisdiction, largely in order to gain 
favorable settlements from individuals who could not easily travel to a federal 
court to pursue their claim.230 Patent law happened to be a particularly stark 
example of the phenomenon: as an area of purely federal jurisdiction, there was 
no tug-of-war regarding removal from state court. And unlike the defensive 
litigation of the railroads involved in tort suits, patentees could actively seek 
out accused infringers for whom the time and cost of responding to a suit could 
be prohibitive. 
The second crucial feature underpinning the large-scale patent enforcement 
effort was the organization of the campaigns themselves. One reason that 
certain patents generated widespread litigation may be that their enforcement 
operated on a franchise model. To pick the largest example: royalty collection 
and litigation under the Andrews brothers’ driven-well patent was often 
handled by local agents and attorneys working on commission.231 Similar 
arrangements appeared elsewhere. One of the high-volume patents litigated in 
the Southern District of New York and Eastern District of Pennsylvania sample 
belonged to Richard Imlay, a pioneering early railroad car designer.232 Thanks 
to the irascible Imlay’s repeated and litigious fallings-out with his own lawyers, 
we know more than usual about the arrangements he made to assert his 
patents.233 Imlay subcontracted enforcement of his most valuable car patent to 
a series of attorneys, giving these agents full authority to demand royalties and 
to file and settle suits in his name in specified territories in return for between 
twenty percent to fifty percent of gross receipts. In between fighting nasty 
 
229. 8 CONG. REC. 303 (1878) (statement of Sen. Windom). 
230. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN 
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 45-49 (1992). 
231. Hayter, supra note 111, at 20-21; Smith, supra note 117, at 59. 
232. JOHN H. WHITE, JR., THE AMERICAN RAILROAD PASSENGER CAR 12-13 (1985). 
233. See, e.g., Report of Examiner & Master, Imlay v. Williams, Equity Case No. 10 (Apr. Term) 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1862) (on file with the National Archives at Philadelphia); Bill of 
Complaint, Gregerson v. Imlay, Equity Case No. 2-97 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1860) (on file 
with the National Archives at New York City). 
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contract disputes with Imlay himself, these attorneys filed dozens of patent 
suits against railroad companies and private car owners.234 Logistical details 
like this help to explain how patent owners in the mid-nineteenth century 
could mount litigation on such a sprawling scale, and also perhaps how the 
incentives of the agents handling enforcement pointed toward ready litigation.  
Why did large-scale enforcement go away? One blunt consideration, which 
might eventually be testable from docket information, relates to patentees’ win 
rates. Given the politics of end-user patent litigation in areas such as the 
Western states, it is possible that judges started on an ad hoc basis to disfavor 
patents that were widely asserted against individuals. Various commentary 
during the 1880s suggested that judicial hostility had become an important 
factor for patentees to consider.235 Whether reversals in court dissuaded 
litigants from pursuing mass enforcement remains an open question for now. 
Absent clear changes in the legal viability of multiple enforcement, the 
drivers of its decline may have been primarily organizational. Among 
patentees, the territorial assignments that created local licensing-and-litigation 
entrepreneurs started to wane in the late nineteenth century, while patentees 
focused more on retaining national rights or selling to larger industrial 
firms.236 On the defendants’ side, it is possible that individuals and other end 
users were increasingly indemnified by manufacturers and suppliers, and thus 
removed from the litigation crosshairs. I have not found any evidence of this to 
date. However, there are other reasons why patent holders may have found it 
preferable to license and litigate further up the supply chain. The bigger picture 
contains a number of structural reasons why the model of patent contestation 
might have changed over the second half of the nineteenth century. These are 
discussed in the Section that follows.  
3. From the Artisanal to the Corporate Economy  
Broadly speaking, the sample of suits under discussion begins in an 
artisanal world of individual traders and small-scale business units, and ends in 
an economy that—if not yet fully corporatized—was more organized, more 
 
234. See sources cited supra note 233. 
235. See infra notes 407-411 and accompanying text (noting the perceived judicial reaction to 
mass enforcement). 
236. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology: 
U.S. Manufacturing in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, in LEARNING BY 
DOING IN FIRMS, MARKETS, AND COUNTRIES 19, 27-29 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al. eds., 
1999). 
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consolidated, and featured a growing number of large firms.237 The 1880s and 
1890s were the “critical decades” during which leading firms made the 
investments in organization, production, and marketing that launched the era 
of managerial capitalism.238 An even more dramatic consolidation occurred 
around the turn of the century, in the form of the “great merger wave.”239 More 
than one thousand eight hundred manufacturing enterprises merged in the 
decade after 1895 to form fewer than 150 industrial combinations, of which 
more than half controlled forty percent or more of their respective markets and 
perhaps as many as a third controlled seventy percent.240 While these changes 
did not reach evenly across the economy, and indeed left many sectors largely 
untouched,241 it would be surprising if crossing this threshold of industrial 
organization had no effect on the patent litigation system. One would expect 
the setting of small-scale proprietary capitalism to provide more opportunities 
for litigation: it featured more entities in the potentially infringing population, 
as well as greater information asymmetries between parties. Independent 
inventors may have had a greater personal incentive (either economic or 
psychological) to enforce their own patents. Conversely, as industries become 
more concentrated and organized, having larger firms on both sides of a patent 
dispute should reduce the likelihood of litigation. Bigger enterprises would 
presumably be more evenly matched as parties, have better information about 
the patented invention and its market value, and might be in possession of 
conflicting patents or patent portfolios—all factors making successful 
bargaining and litigation avoidance more likely.  
Several measures from the Southern District of New York and Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania sample illustrate the shift from an atomized to a more 
corporatized litigation environment. Figures 8 and 9 show the percentages of 
plaintiffs and defendants identified in the case title as individuals (Figure 8) 
and companies (Figure 9). Again, this is an imperfect proxy for the identity of 
the actual parties to the dispute: plaintiffs listed by their individual names may 
 
237. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL 
CAPITALISM (1990) [hereinafter CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE]; ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., 
THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); 
HOUNSHELL, supra note 62; NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904 (1985).  
238. CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE, supra note 237, at 62-63.  
239. See LAMOREAUX, supra note 237. 
240. Id. at 2. 
241. See PHILIP SCRANTON, ENDLESS NOVELTY: SPECIALTY PRODUCTION AND AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1865-1925 (1997) (emphasizing that during the Second Industrial 
Revolution, many localities and industries remained dominated by smaller enterprises 
engaged in specialty and batch production). 
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have been inventors who were also principals of their own companies, whereas 
individual defendants may have been officers or agents of companies that were 
not named in the complaint or docket.242 Nevertheless, it is a suggestive 
indicator. The percentages of suits brought by and against individuals fell 
steadily from nearly one hundred percent to barely twenty percent, while the 
percentages naming companies as parties rose to seventy percent to seventy-
five percent.243  
Figure 8. 
percent of plaintiffs and defendants named in suit as individuals, 
southern district of new york and eastern district of pennsylvania, 
sample years 1840-1910244 
 
 
242. Where a suit was brought by or against an individual and a company together, I categorized 
the party as a company.  
243. Not every party was clearly an individual (or group of individuals) or a company. Some 
titles that suggested partnerships or involved government entities or charities were 
categorized separately. 
244.  Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
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Figure 9. 
percent of plaintiffs and defendants named in suit as companies, 
southern district of new york and eastern district of pennsylvania, 
sample years 1840-1910245 
 
 
The changing corporate basis of the economy went hand-in-hand with 
changes in the context of invention and patent ownership. Inventive activity 
throughout the nineteenth century was dominated by what we would now 
think of as independent inventors: entrepreneurs, freelancers, or contractors 
who retained their patent rights or sold them on the open market, rather than 
employee-inventors inventing for hire and automatically assigning their patent 
rights to their employers.246 The market for patent rights was active from an 
early date.247 Those who received patents commonly obtained a return either 
by selling them outright or by using the grants to commercialize their 
inventions in a variety of ways. Some assigned territorial rights to producers in 
different geographic markets; others attracted capital by assigning partial 
 
245.  Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
246. See CATHERINE FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-1930 (1st ed. 2009); Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, 
supra note 236.  
247. See KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION, supra note 21, at 96 (noting that 
antebellum patents were assigned and resold for large sums). 
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shares to investors.248 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, invention 
began to occur more frequently under the sponsorship and direction of 
established firms. According to data gathered by Naomi Lamoreaux and 
Kenneth Sokoloff, the proportion of patents assigned on or before the date of 
issue—generally an indicator of a pre-patenting financing or employment 
relationship between the inventor and the assignee—rose from 18% in 1870-71 
to 29% in 1890-91 and 31% in 1910-11.249 Within that group, inventors became 
less likely to assign to entities in which they were themselves principals, and 
became more likely to assign all of their rights, rather than just a portion.250 
The assignment profile of patents in litigation changed in keeping with 
these developments. Most patent suits in the Southern District of New York 
and Eastern District of Pennsylvania sample were not brought by the inventors 
themselves, or at least not by inventors acting alone. The proportion of 
litigated patents that had never been assigned before suit fell steadily from just 
over 60% in 1840 to under 20% in 1910 (Figure 10). To be sure, that means a 
fair amount of litigation by purely independent inventors was still occurring in 
the early twentieth century. But the overall decline is another data point 
suggesting that patent owners who litigated were tied into an increasingly 
organized financial or corporate setting as time went on. Likewise, the 
proportion of litigated patents assigned on or before issue rose to around 45% 
by 1910 (Figure 10), a rate considerably higher than the 31% of all issued 
patents that Lamoreaux and Sokoloff found were assigned by the time of 
issue.251  
 
248. Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 236.  
249. Id. at 28. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
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Figure 10. 
percent of litigated patents never assigned and assigned before 
issue, southern district of new york and eastern district of 
pennsylvania, sample years 1840-1910252 
 
 
For the record, it is not clear whether we should think that lone inventors 
who did not assign would be more likely to litigate. One would expect them to 
have a stronger personal stake in their patents, potentially increasing their 
desire to litigate, in which case their relative decline in the sample would 
contribute to the falling litigiousness of the patent system. On the other hand, 
inventors who did not assign to their own or others’ companies or grant partial 
rights in return for investment probably had fewer assets to bring to bear on 
enforcement. Looking at the high-volume and single-suit patent subsamples, 
there were years in which the former featured more independent never-
assigning inventors and years in which the balance was reversed.253 
It is unsurprising that patent litigation reflected the growing 
corporatization of the industrial economy over time. Without a control group 
of nonlitigating patent owners, it is hard to gauge the extent to which either 
the type of entity or the relationship between inventor and assignee affected the 
 
252.  Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
253. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10; Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra 
note 10. 
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propensity to litigate. But it remains likely that the drop-off in litigiousness in 
1890, 1900, and 1910 resulted in part from the changing scale of business. At 
the very least, it is possible to trace the development of arrangements by which 
formerly litigious actors turned away from using the courts. Around the end of 
the century, the electrical-manufacturing sector consolidated around a few 
corporate giants, whose size and dominance made litigation among themselves 
undesirable and suits against smaller operators far less necessary.254 The Bell 
Telephone enterprise (later AT&T), prodigious enforcers of Alexander Graham 
Bell’s controlling patents in the 1880s and early 1890s, possessed similarly 
fundamental patents on long-distance telephony in the 1900s—but almost 
never brought suit after 1908, preferring to seek market power by financial and 
organizational means.255 Elsewhere—and to be sure, often after a burst of 
litigation—other industries began to form large-scale patent pooling 
arrangements: in automobiles, aviation, explosives, and film projection 
equipment, to name a few examples.256 As the twentieth century progressed, 
firms’ ability to incorporate patents into broader schemes of industrial control 
pushed litigation to the margins. 
The patent litigation explosion had no single explanation: characteristics of 
the patents issued, the identity and strategies of the parties in suit, and changes 
in the overall economy all contributed to its rise and fall. As today, though, the 
experience of a boom in aggregate patent suits made its mark on the law. 
i i i .  cases,  controversies,  and the development of patent 
 law 
The nineteenth-century patent litigation explosion has been largely out of 
sight in histories of American patent law. This final Part suggests that the sheer 
volume of suits and the political and legal controversies surrounding them 
shaped the development of the law, both in the context of particular 
foundational cases and more broadly in patent law’s shift from law to equity. It 
also argues that the volume of litigation produced a backlash against the patent 
system that threatened the existing statutory framework. 
 
254. See, e.g., HAROLD C. PASSER, THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS, 1875-1900, at 331 (1975) 
(describing the formation of the General Electric-Westinghouse Board of Patent Control in 
1896).  
255. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 76-340, at 213-14 (1939).  
256. Jonathan Barnett, The Anticommons Revisited, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 21-25, 32-35, 57-58) (on file with author). 
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A. The Formation of Patent Law  
Large-scale, repeat-player litigation must have shaped the development of 
patent jurisprudence in general. For one thing, the litigation explosion 
coincided with the formative period of patent doctrine. Based on citation 
counts, John Duffy identifies “what is almost certainly the golden age of the 
Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence—the decade from 1850 to 1859,  during 
which the Court decided at least a half dozen cases articulating fundamental 
principles of patent law.”257 Craig Nard and Andrew Morriss posit a period of 
“judicial evolution of patent law” in between the two Patent Acts of 1836 and 
1870, locating the “key developments” in the case law of the 1850s.258 Adam 
Mossoff has gone into still finer detail, offering the Supreme Court’s eight 
patent decisions of the 1853 Term as a peak of judicial engagement “with the 
working details of the American patent system.”259 When one looks at the 
formative cases in question, they are disproportionately drawn from the major-
litigation efforts.  
Take, for example, the eight cases of the Supreme Court’s 1853 Term. They 
did not all represent separate controversies. Two concerned the Morse 
telegraph patent;260 two the Woodworth planing machine patent;261 and two 
involved suits brought by Henry Burden, a noted inventor and ironworking 
magnate, against one of the country’s leading industrialists, the iron and 
railroad entrepreneur Erastus Corning.262 The remaining cases concerned 
patents to Cyrus McCormick, of the mechanical reaper, and to Ross Winans, a 
 
257. John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 289. Duffy names as key cases Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 
322 (1858), which discusses abandonment; Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 
(1856), which discusses extraterritoriality; Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 
(1853), which discusses the doctrine of equivalents; O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 
(1853), which discusses abstract ideas; Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850), 
which discusses nonobviousness; and Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477 (1850), which 
discusses novelty. Duffy, supra, at 289 n.52. 
258. Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice and Interest Groups in the 
Development of American Patent Law: 1790-1865, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143, 160-67 (2011).  
259. Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 322 
(2009).  
260. Smith v. Ely, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 137 (1853); O’Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62. 
261. Livingston v. Woodworth, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 546 (1853); Brooks v. Fiske, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 
212 (1853). 
262. Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 451 (1853); Corning v. Burden, 56 
U.S. (15 How.) 252 (1853); see also Mammoth Patent Lawsuit, SCI. AM., June 4, 1859, at 325. 
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pioneering (and extremely wealthy) railroad engineer and manufacturer.263 In 
every case, leading industrial interests of the country were involved. Most of 
the patents had come to the Supreme Court after widespread campaigns of 
litigation in the lower courts. Burden’s and Woodworth’s patents had appeared 
in the Supreme Court before—Woodworth’s no less than six times since 
1846.264 
This clutch of cases suggests in miniature what was more broadly  
true of patent law at the time. Case law, like litigation, was dominated  
by contests over high-profile patents. Once one starts reconstructing  
the judicial evolution of patent law, the same patents and parties are  
everywhere. An inveterate reader of treatise footnotes might notice particular 
names repeating in the case citations—for example, Parker v. Haworth, on the 
strict liability of infringement;265 Parker v. Stiles, on infringement by 
“mechanical equivalents”;266 Parker v. Hulme, on protecting the “principle” of 
an invention267—without appreciating that these cases formed part of a single 
legal campaign.268 At the very least, multiple litigation and mass enforcement 
were jurisgenerative, in the sense of creating many opportunities for the courts 
to create doctrine in an area of law dominated by judge-made rules. 
There is also something to be gained from knowing the baggage that the 
most controversial patents brought with them into court: the interests and 
alliances represented; the strategies tested; and the sectional, political, and 
economic stakes involved.269 During the Supreme Court’s celebrated 1853 
Term, for example, the Justices were repeatedly divided even as they decided a 
 
263. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480 (1853); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 
How.) 330 (1853). 
264. Woodworth’s patent appeared in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852); 
Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850); Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 
(1850); Wilson v. Barnum, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 258 (1850); Barnard v. Gibson, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 
650 (1849); and Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646 (1846), which was argued with 
Wilson v. Turner, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 712 (1846); Woodworth v. Wilson, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 712 
(1846); and Simpson v. Wilson, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 709 (1846). Burden’s patent had been 
argued in the 1852 Term. See Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 193 
(1852).  
265. 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1141 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740). 
266. 18 F. Cas. 1135, 1136 (C.C.D. Ill. 1848) (No. 10,738). 
267. 18 F. Cas. 1163 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 10,749). 
268. See, e.g., Bracha, supra note 183, at 439 n.144, 443 n.162, 453-54. 
269. See Brian J. Love, Bad Actors and the Evolution of Patent Law, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5-7 
(2015) (arguing that much confounding case law in patent jurisprudence can be explained 
by courts’ ad hoc needs to discipline perceived bad actors in the patent system). 
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cluster of cases later considered foundational in the law of patent scope.270 In 
Winans v. Denmead, a slim majority of the Court led by Justice Curtis applied 
and reaffirmed the liberal approach to claim construction, including its 
application to cover what would later be called “mechanical equivalents” of the 
claimed invention.271 Four dissenting Justices insisted, to the contrary, on 
“exactness, preciseness, and particularity in the description of the invention, its 
principle, and of the matter claimed.”272 However, the same Term saw the strict 
constructionists in the majority in O’Reilly v. Morse, which held the broadest 
claim of Morse’s telegraph patent “illegal and void” over a three-Justice 
dissent.273 (Justice McLean joined the dissenters from Winans to form the 
majority in O’Reilly, while the liberal-constructionist Justice Curtis was 
recused).274 And in Brooks v. Fiske, a Woodworth patent case, the strict-
constructionist wing prevailed again, this time joined by Justice Grier.275  
It is not difficult to find language in these opinions that reflects the 
controversies in the patent system more generally. Justice Campbell, dissenting 
in Winans, noted that patents were “very frequently employed to obstruct 
invention, and to deter from legitimate operations of skill and ingenuity,” and 
protested that “[n]othing, in the administration of this law, will be more 
mischievous, more productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of exorbitant 
and unjust pretensions and vexations [sic] demands” than a loose approach to 
patent scope.276 The voting blocs themselves are suggestive of political fault 
lines. The reliable group of four strict constructionists consisted of Southern 
Democrats led by the arch-Jacksonian, Chief Justice Taney.277 Jacksonian 
antimonopoly politics were likely part of the backdrop to decisions against 
powerful patent interests.278 Conversely, in Winans, Justice Curtis—a 
Massachusetts jurist who had represented Morse in the telegraph litigation, 
 
270. See Lutz, supra note 174, at 384. 
271. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853); see also Duffy, supra note 257, at 311-12 (noting that the 
decision in Winans followed established practice in construing the scope of the patent); 
Sarnoff, supra note 179, at 393-97 (discussing Winans).  
272. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
273. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120 (1853). 
274. See id.  
275. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 212 (1853). 
276. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
277. For the Justices’ biographical details, see TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE TANEY COURT: 
JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 31-114 (2003). 
278. See Mossoff, supra note 73, at 64-71. 
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and whose brother was the leading patent treatise writer of the day—led a wing 
of the Court that included all of its Northern- and Whig-appointed Justices.279 
The Woodworth cases of the 1840s and early 1850s give a further sense of 
the doctrinal reach of highly contested patent campaigns. These cases returned 
repeatedly to questions of licensees’ and users’ rights, including whether 
licensees under the original term of the patent retained permission to use under 
the extended term, and whether authorized users of the patented planing 
machine had any rights to repair or reconstruct the device as it wore out. The 
Supreme Court made important law on these issues, deciding in favor of users 
in decisions that explicitly grappled with the balance between the rights of 
inventors and the public.280 These cases have been conceptually influential as 
well. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion for the Court in one of these cases, Bloomer 
v. McQuewan,281 would later be hailed as a notable statement of the idea that a 
patent grant is a mere “franchise” conveying a right to exclude, rather than a 
right founded in the inventor’s natural property.282 If we were to take seriously 
the political context within which these ideas and doctrines developed, then the 
fact that they emerged from battles over the most notorious patent monopoly 
of their day is highly relevant.  
The same sensitivity to political background applies even where more 
innocuous suits provided the vehicles for new lawmaking, because their 
context was inescapable: judges do not make law in a vacuum, and the political 
economy of patent law, in both Congress and the courts, was overshadowed by 
the existence of high-profile clashes over invention. On the other hand, tying 
the great patent campaigns to particular doctrinal moves is generally difficult 
and may be beyond the scope of this Article. The major exception might be the 
shift to equity. 
B. The Rise of Equity 
The nineteenth-century shift of patent litigation from common law to 
equity was deeply important to the evolution of patent law. On an institutional 
level, it began the first of two great swings in the role of the jury that have 
characterized American patent adjudication. Jury trials at common law initially 
dominated, only to all but die out in favor of bench trials in equity during the 
 
279. HUEBNER, supra note 277, at 97-101. 
280. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852); Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 
How.) 646 (1846); Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and 
the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 433-43 (1999). 
281. 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 549. 
282. See Mossoff, supra note 178, at 966 n.58.  
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late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For more than a century, patent 
contests in court were almost all before judges, until jury proceedings returned 
in the 1980s and 1990s; they now feature in the majority (over seventy 
percent) of patent trials today.283 The long period of equity dominance also had 
consequences for the substance of patent law. Much of the overall body of 
patent jurisprudence was developed within the equity framework. As a result 
patent law is riddled with equitable approaches to judicial reasoning and 
lawmaking—not only in the law of remedies, but also in such explicitly equity-
based doctrines as patent misuse, inequitable conduct, and laches, as well as 
other essentially equitable judge-made contributions such as the doctrine of 
equivalents,284 the experimental use exception to the statutory public use bar, 
and the nonstatutory bar to patentability created by secret commercial sales.285  
For such an important watershed, the original movement to equity has 
remained surprisingly obscure. Conventional wisdom in patent scholarship 
holds that patent suits migrated from the common law to the equity 
jurisdiction of the federal courts after 1870, when statutory reform allowed 
patentees to receive both damages and injunctions in equity actions.286 This is 
inaccurate though. The shift to equity as patent law’s forum of choice 
 
283. See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1705-06 
(2013). 
284. See Donald R. Dunner & J. Michael Jakes, The Equitable Doctrine of Equivalents, 75 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 857 (1993); Harold C. Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the 
Equities To Determine Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and Other Emerging Technologies, 18 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1992).  
285. See Dmitry Karshtedt, Did Learned Hand Get It Wrong?: The Questionable Patent Forfeiture 
Rule of Metallizing Engineering, 57 VILL. L. REV. 261 (2012) (discussing the admittedly 
complicated role of equitable reasoning and precedent in the formulation of the Metallizing 
Engineering rule); see also Lemley, supra note 283, at 1702-04 (noting that the period of equity 
dominance included the courts’ construction of the 1870 Patent Act, which “made a number 
of modifications to the patent system, from solidifying the PTO bureaucracy to the 
establishment of various requirements for novelty, statutory bars, enablement, and 
inventorship that continue in much the same language to this day” (footnote omitted)).  
286. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (Nies, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Act of 1870 changed the way patent cases were 
thereafter tried. Jury trials virtually disappeared, not to be seen again in any numbers for 
over a century.”); Lemley, supra note 283, at 1702-04 (“After 1870, the use of juries in patent 
cases essentially disappeared, and judges took over not only the role of invalidating patents 
in revocation proceedings but also the job of deciding personal defenses in patent 
infringement suits.”); Lutz, supra note 174, at 470 (“After 1870 patentees resorted to actions 
at law with decreasing frequency until finally the jurisdiction of equity over infringement 
suits became for all practical purposes exclusive.”). But see KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF 
INVENTION, supra note 21, at 100-02 (discussing the growing use of equity during the 
1840s); Lubar, supra note 30, at 955-58 (locating the rise of equity in the 1850s). 
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happened earlier, in the 1850s and 1860s, and was closely linked to the rise of 
large-scale patent litigation. 
Some background is in order here. Common law and equity jurisdiction 
existed in parallel in the federal courts until 1938.287 Cases filed at law or in 
equity were heard in the same courts before the same district and circuit 
judges, but occupied separate dockets and possessed distinct features. The 
central difference, at least to begin with, related to remedies: actions at law 
allowed for damages, whereas suits in equity yielded injunctions and other 
equitable remedies.288 Yet law and equity also represented quite different 
doctrinal traditions, procedural practices, and sources of decision making 
(equity having no jury).289 Of the two, equity was the latecomer to patent 
practice. The earliest patent acts provided for suits to be filed at common law in 
the federal courts to recover damages for infringement, but did not make 
similar provision for equity actions, meaning that patent holders could sue in 
equity only where the courts’ diversity jurisdiction applied.290 This anomaly 
was remedied in the Patent Act of 1819, after which patent cases could be 
readily brought under either the common law or equity jurisdictions of the 
federal courts.291  
Equity was initially the secondary forum, however. Courts took the 
position that any case that tested the validity of a patent (as opposed to turning 
on questions of infringement alone) should first be tried at law to a jury before 
any equitable remedy could be granted. Under the English rule, associated with 
Lord Chancellor Eldon and widely cited by judges and treatise writers, 
injunctions were allowed only where validity was uncontested or had been 
presumptively established by prior litigation or long acquiescence.292 According 
 
287. See generally SURRENCY, supra note 11, at 232-46 (detailing the operation of equity 
jurisdiction in parallel with common law and describing the eventual merger of the two 
jurisdictions). 
288. See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 25, at 26 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 2d ed. 1839) 
(distinguishing law and equity with reference to remedies and noting that “Equity 
Jurisprudence may, therefore, properly be said to be that portion of remedial justice, which 
is exclusively administered by a Court of Equity”).  
289. See id. §§ 26-33, at 26-33 (detailing the remedial, procedural, and functional distinctions 
between courts of common law and courts of equity); SURRENCY, supra note 11, at 229-38 
(describing the early development of equity law and its procedural departures from common 
law). 
290. See 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 1083, at 392-
93 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1890).  
291. See id. §§ 1083-1084, at 393; Patent Act of 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481.  
292. See, e.g., GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL 
INVENTIONS §§ 324-329, at 429-34 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 2d ed. 1854).  
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to a leading treatise on patent law published in 1837, this approach rendered a 
bill for an injunction “ancillary, merely, to the action at law for damages.”293 It 
also created a frequently cumbersome interplay of separate law and equity 
actions relating to the same disputes. In equity cases where the validity of the 
patent was doubtful or contested, judges would require the patent holder to re-
file his suit as a common-law action, before returning to the equity side if 
successful to seek an injunction.294 As an alternative the court might formulate 
a “feigned issue” to be referred to a jury. This old equity practice employed a 
legal fiction—traditionally a dispute over a fictitious wager—to allow chancery 
courts to refer specific questions of fact to a jury for a special advisory 
verdict.295 The use of feigned issues waned generally in the nineteenth century, 
but judges used the practice intermittently to resolve evidentiary conflicts in 
patent disputes as late as the 1850s.296 
During the middle of the century, both the law and the usage of equity 
shifted. Courts became more liberal in allowing validity issues to be resolved 
directly through hearings in equity, and patentees sought the equity 
jurisdiction more often. Crucially, cases involving large-scale litigation were 
central to the change in judicial treatment, and the patent litigation explosion 
generally lurked in the background of these developments. The key moment 
came in the late 1840s and early 1850s, just as large-scale patent enforcement 
began to pose difficult questions of consistency and cost for patentees and 
administrative economy for the courts. As Judge Kane of Philadelphia, whose 
court had lately been swamped by cases on the Woodworth, Parker, and Morse 
patents, explained in 1849: any plaintiff victorious at law had merely  
triumphed—in one cause—against one defendant—in one judicial 
district. Each new defendant, each new cause, opens anew the whole 
question of originality of his invention;—and for each succeeding trial, 
in each of the thirty odd judicial districts of the United States . . . the 
patentee is to come prepared, with all his testimony, to encounter the 
same vexations, and abide the same hazard.297 
 
293. WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS: INCLUDING THE REMEDIES AND 
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO PATENT RIGHTS 452 (Boston, Am. Stationers Co. 1837). 
294. See CURTIS, supra note 292, §§ 325-343, at 430-48. 
295. See Stephen E. Sachs, The Feigned Issue in the Federal System (Nov. 26, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1032682 [http://perma.cc/Y7YW 
-TYEB].  
296. See Silsby v. Foote, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 378 (1857); Sachs, supra note 295, at 31 n.124. 
297. John K. Kane, Address Delivered at the Close of the Nineteenth Exhibition of American 
Manufactures (Oct. 1849); see also Parker v. Sears, 18 F. Cas. 1159, 1160 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) 
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Equity at least allowed for the imposition of preliminary injunctions, for the 
use and reuse of written-testimony evidence, and for the operation of judicial 
comity in enforcing patents that had previously been sustained elsewhere. 
Gradually, large-scale patent enforcers and their judicial supporters began 
to put pressure on assumptions about the respective roles of equity and law. 
One salient example of this tendency is Motte v. Bennett, a Woodworth case in 
South Carolina in 1849.298 Defendants sought to bring the validity of 
Woodworth’s patent before a jury, while the Woodworth interests, represented 
by former New York Governor William Seward, insisted that the suit be 
disposed of in equity. In a lengthy opinion, Justice Wayne, riding circuit, 
reviewed English and American practice and explained that neither required a 
trial at law in order to grant injunctive relief where the right had been well 
established.299 After years of successful litigation around the country, Justice 
Wayne declared, the originality and integrity of Woodworth’s grant was 
“almost a universally received opinion,” duly deserving a permanent injunction 
without additional jury fact finding.300 Opponents of the Woodworth 
syndicate greeted this decision as a dangerous erosion of the jury principle in 
patent law.301 
The real turning point, however, was Goodyear v. Day (The Great India 
Rubber Case) heard in Trenton, New Jersey, in 1852.302 Defendant Horace Day, 
a rubber manufacturer and longtime antagonist of Goodyear, retained the 
renowned orator Rufus Choate to present his defense. The Goodyear interests 
responded by recruiting legendary advocate (and sitting U.S. Secretary of 
State) Daniel Webster for an enormous fee.303 These two eminent figures 
joined battle over whether Goodyear’s claim could be resolved in equity alone, 
or whether the case and its four-thousand-page record should be put to a jury 
before equitable relief could be considered.304 Choate argued the overwhelming 
weight of authority for his cause, lining up English and American cases and 
 
(No. 10,748) (noting that “[t]he terms of this court are almost wholly occupied in the trial 
of patent cases”).  
298. 17 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.D.S.C. 1849) (No. 9,884). 
299. Id. at 911-16. 
300. Id. at 916. 
301. See Lubar, supra note 30, at 957 & n.89 (noting hostile editorials in Scientific American). 
302. 10 F. Cas. 678 (C.C.D.N.J. 1852) (No. 5,569). 
303. KORMAN, supra note 77, at 129-30. 
304. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 
429, at 459 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 3d ed. 1867); DANIEL WEBSTER, SPEECH OF THE 
HON. DANIEL WEBSTER IN THE GREAT INDIA-RUBBER SUIT, at v (New York, Arthur & Burnet 
1852). 
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treatises in support of a trial at law.305 Webster appealed to practicality and 
judicial discretion. He noted that a court of equity had the power to disregard 
jury fact finding after a directed trial—and if the court was not bound by the 
outcome, then it must not be bound to require the jury in the first place.306 
Webster argued that the court, having “listened with great patience” to a 
week’s worth of evidence and argument, was left with only  
[t]he necessity of expediting business, and the fact which everybody 
knows, that a court of enlightened judges is not only as competent, but 
more competent to settle questions arising under the construction of a 
patent, so often mixed of law and facts . . . a combination of them leads 
courts not uselessly to send patents to law, to be tried by a jury.307 
In a decisive move for equity jurisdiction, Justice Grier declined to have the 
case tried at law. Grier acknowledged the English rule, but stated: 
[E]ven there the rule is not absolute or universal; it is a practice 
founded more on convenience than necessity. It always rests on the 
sound discretion of the court. A trial at law is ordered by a chancellor to 
inform his conscience; not because either party may demand it as a 
right, or that a court of equity is incompetent to judge of questions of 
fact, or of legal titles.308 
“In the courts of the United States,” Justice Grier further noted, “the practice is 
by no means so general as in England.”309 He supported his preference for 
equity by referring to the limited capacities of juries in the face of modern 
patent litigation:  
Cases involving inquiries into the most complex and difficult  
questions of mechanics and philosophy, are becoming numerous in the 
courts . . . . It is no reflection on trial by jury to say, that cases 
frequently occur, in which ten out of twelve jurors do not understand 
the principles of science, mathematics, or philosophy, necessary to a 
correct judgment of the case.310  
 
305. The Great India Rubber Case, 10 F. Cas. at 681.  
306. Id. at 682. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. at 683. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. 
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Furthermore, “[i]t would require three or four weeks at least, to try this case 
before a jury, if this library of testimony were read to them; and at least as 
many months, if the witnesses were examined viva voce, as they probably 
would be . . . .”311 Based on his reading of the record and on the Goodyear 
patent’s earlier victories in other circuit courts, Justice Grier was content to 
proceed without using a jury to “inform his conscience.”312 
These decisions and a few others313—but Goodyear especially—broke down 
the procedural obstacles to hearing patent cases entirely in equity. The leading 
treatise writer, George Ticknor Curtis, noted in 1867 that his earlier editions on 
patents had repeated the English rule of trials at law before a jury, and then 
quoted Grier’s decision at length “in direct opposition to such opinion.”314 By 
1881, the Supreme Court was asserting that “[w]hatever question may have 
existed in reference to [the rule] previously was settled in the courts of the 
United States by Goodyear, a case argued by Webster and Choate, and decided 
by Mr. Justice Grier in 1852.”315 Progressively, if not overnight, “this doctrine 
[had] gained additional importance, and was applied to such advantage that 
trials at law upon the merits of the controversy slowly disappeared.”316 
Equity jurisdiction had compelling attractions for plaintiffs and judges 
alike. Cases like Goodyear and Motte show what the large-scale patent litigants 
wanted from equity: credit for their earlier victories in long enforcement 
campaigns, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against infringers, 
quicker resolution of cases that went to a hearing without the time and expense 
 
311. Id.  
312. Id.; DECISION IN THE GREAT INDIA RUBBER CASE OF CHARLES GOODYEAR VS. HORACE H. DAY 
7 (New York, 1852). Justice Grier may have been influenced by his previous experience in 
adjudicating Goodyear’s claims. See, e.g., Day v. Goodyear, 7 F. Cas. 240 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 
1850) (No. 3,678) (finding Goodyear’s reissued patent not invalid and denying Day’s 
motion to enjoin Goodyear’s infringement action). 
313. See, e.g., Sickles v. Gloucester Co., 22 F. Cas. 92, 94 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1856) (No. 12,840) (“In 
many questions of originality and infringement of patents, the concurrent opinion of twelve 
men, with little knowledge of the principles of science and philosophy which affect the case, 
may give but little satisfaction to the conscience of a chancellor: Hence it is becoming more 
common to examine these questions in courts of equity, without the aid of a jury .”); Nevins 
v. Johnson, 18 F. Cas. 28, 29 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853) (No. 10,136) (sustaining equity 
jurisdiction in a case where the patent had expired and no injunction was possible, on the 
grounds that “[t]he manifest purpose of [C]ongress [was] to give to the circuit courts in 
equity every power requisite to the entire protection of patent rights”); Parker v. Hatfield, 18 
F. Cas. 1127, 1133 (C.C.D. Ohio 1845) (No. 10,736) (referring the factual questions on 
validity to a special master in equity, rather than to a jury). 
314. CURTIS, supra note 304, § 429, at 459. 
315. Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 205 (1881) (citation omitted). 
316. ROBINSON, supra note 290, § 1085, at 396. 
 the first patent litigation explosion 
919 
 
of oral courtroom testimony, and perhaps especially—though tacitly—
avoidance of juries who might be hostile to their reputedly monopolistic 
grants. Not all patent plaintiffs were repeat players or large-scale litigants, but 
the promise of repeatable enforcement, quicker process, and injunctive relief 
apparently had appeal beyond the multiple-litigation setting.317 In addition, 
equity jurisdiction did include facilities for securing monetary recovery 
alongside injunctive remedies. Successful plaintiffs in equity could seek an 
accounting and award of the infringer’s profits on use or sale of the patented 
invention.318 The significance of equity courts acquiring a damages remedy in 
the 1870 Patent Act has been overstated,319 but it is true that the two 
jurisdictions’ remedies were asymmetrical even before 1870: equity offered 
injunctions and infringers’ profits, while suits at law offered only money 
damages.320 
For their part, judges gained procedural efficiency, more control over the 
direction and disposition of patent law, and more ability to vindicate the rights 
of those whom they considered deserving patentees.321 Zorian Khan has argued 
 
317. See infra Table 5 (showing the use of equity by almost all plaintiffs in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in the sample years after 1865). 
318. CURTIS, supra note 304, §§ 434-436, at 465-70. Profits included only the actual monetary 
profits or savings made by the infringer. Id. § 436, at 469. As such they were a narrower 
kind of recovery than damages at law, which offered the possibility of triple damages and 
could be calculated on a range of metrics of the patentee’s loss and/or infringer’s gain. Id. §§ 
337-338, at 343-48. The relative potential of equitable profit awards and damages at law 
depended on the identity of the infringer and the nature of the use: commercial sellers or 
industrial users of the patented invention could produce very large awards in an accounting 
of profits; individual (or financially unsuccessful) infringers might offer none, whereas at 
least in law the latter could have been subjected to damages based on the royalty demanded. 
One might have thought that this would create an advantage for actions at law in end-user 
litigation, although that does not seem to have played out in practice.  
319. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (Nies, J., dissenting) (“The 1870 Act gave equity courts in patent infringement suits 
the special power to award common law damages. Since most patentees wanted an 
injunction available only in equity, as well as the equity discovery procedure to aid in proof 
of infringement, the equity court became the forum of choice.” (citation omitted)); Lemley, 
supra note 283, at 1704 (“[B]ecause under the 1870 Act a patentee who wanted both an 
injunction and damages had to proceed in a court of equity, virtually none of the patent 
cases decided in this period were tried to a jury.”). 
320. ROBINSON, supra note 290, §§ 1085-1087, at 395-99. 
321. See, e.g., Motte v. Bennett, 17 F. Cas. 909, 917 (C.C.D.S.C. 1849) (No. 9,884) 
(“Woodworth’s planing machine . . . now does, in every part of the civilized world, that 
which could not be done before with the same efficiency by machinery, and which is not 
here done in any degree by any machine which has been before the courts of the United 
States, unless by piracy of Woodworth’s combination.”); Kane, supra note 297, at 4 (“I have 
seen men, over and again, who had grown grey in litigation and penury, by seeking to 
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that judges embraced equity as part of a reaction against the patent 
monopolization efforts of the 1840s and 1850s, preferring equitable 
jurisprudence because it gave them more flexibility in balancing the rights of 
patentees against the interests of the public.322 Yet judicial skepticism of large-
scale patent enforcement seems an unlikely reason for the liberalization of 
equity. Khan underestimates the role of patentees in pushing for equity 
liberalization: parties like Goodyear and Woodworth actively sought equity 
decision making, suggesting that it was not a forum chosen to constrain them. 
This suggests that whatever judges gained in terms of discretion to rein in 
monopolies was far outweighed by the advantages to mass enforcers of having 
equity procedure and bench (rather than jury) trials at their disposal.  
This is not to say that the courts lacked overarching institutional agendas of 
their own. To the extent that broader judicial aims guided the shift to equity, 
those aims likely reflected the strain of legal and economic nationalism that 
held sway on the federal bench.323 Famously, in 1842, the Supreme Court ruled 
in Swift v. Tyson324 that federal courts were not required to follow the decisions 
of state courts in commercial cases, opening the way for the development of a 
general federal common law.325 If anything, equity was an even greater 
repository of hopes for centralization and consistency at a time when both 
Congress and the courts were preoccupied with disuniformity in the 
administration of federal justice.326 Well before Swift, federal judges created a 
nonstate body of equity principles to govern procedures, remedies, and in some 
 
vindicate for themselves the rights, which the faith of the Government was pledged that 
they should enjoy. I have known a patent, among the most meritorious that have done 
honor to our country, which, after the lapse of more than twenty years, had produced 
nothing to the inventor but barren praise and substantial wretchedness.”). 
322. KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION, supra note 21, at 101-03 (“In the absence of 
antitrust statutes, equity provided a more flexible channel for mediating between the 
inventor’s exclusive rights and a general monopoly.”). 
323. See TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 18-22 (1981) (describing a widespread attachment to federal law as a source of 
uniformity in commercial law); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1780-1860, at 250-51 (1979) (detecting “an attempt to impose a procommercial 
national legal order on unwilling state courts”).  
324. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).  
325. See FREYER, supra note 323, at 4-43; PURCELL, supra note 230, at 24. 
326. See Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made 
Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 255-56 (2010) (arguing that “the Supreme 
Court’s insistence that lower federal courts apply a uniform body of equity principles is best 
understood as a response to contemporary concerns about disuniformity and institutional 
incapacity in the federal judicial system—concerns shared by many jurists and legislators 
with otherwise substantially different views regarding the proper scope of federal power”).  
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cases substantive rights on the equity side of the court.327 Midcentury found 
the Supreme Court continuing to insist that federal equity was a distinct and 
uniform body of law, independent of state laws and procedures.328 Patent law, 
as an exclusively federal domain, did not possess the tensions with state law 
that animated the Court’s use of equity in other areas.329 But as the number of 
patent suits they heard on circuit grew rapidly, the justices’ recurrent concerns 
about disuniformity and unpredictability in the federal courts would have 
applied equally to patent decision making.330  
In any event, the dramatic pull of the liberalized equity jurisdiction for 
patent law was clear on the ground. In the Southern District of New York in 
1850, nine patent suits were filed in equity compared to twenty-seven filed at 
law.331 By 1860 the balance was reversed: eighty suits commenced in equity and 
only thirty at law. By 1870 cases at law had largely disappeared.332 Slightly 
more granular numbers are obtainable for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
and are shown in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
327. Id. at 265-91 (tracing this development throughout the first half of the nineteenth century 
and locating its emergence as an established norm in the 1810s). 
328. SWISHER, supra note 67, at 324-25; Collins, supra note 326, at 285-87.  
329. See Collins, supra note 326, at 285-89 (describing the applications of federal equity as part of 
a complex “vertical choice-of-law regime”). 
330. See id. at 330-32 (noting that circuit riding gave the justices firsthand experience of dis-
uniformity in the federal courts). 
331. Author’s Database, C.C.S.D.N.Y., supra note 10. 
332. Id. 
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Table 5. 
suits filed in law and equity, eastern district of pennsylvania, sample 
years 1840-1910333 
Year Patent Suits Filed at Law 
Patent Suits Filed 
in Equity 
Number of Those Suits 
Appearing in Both  
Law and Equity 
1840 28 9 8 
1850 36 157 3 
1860 43 50 4 
1865 4 39 0 
1870 4 102 0 
1880 1 87 1 
1890 2 82 0 
1900 0 66 0 
1910 1 63 0 
  
Common law was clearly the forum of choice in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in 1840: only nine suits were filed in equity, eight of them by the 
railroad inventor Isaac Cooper, and all eight of Cooper’s cases were filed at law 
as well.334 Equity made its breakthrough by 1850, when the wave of Parker 
water wheel suits dominated the equity docket.335 In 1860 the court’s caseload 
was still mixed, but the suits filed on the law side had taken on a distinct cast: 
almost all were filed against railroads, relatively deep-pocketed defendants 
against whom a damages judgment might be quite lucrative, and almost half 
were filed under Richard Imlay’s railroad-car patent, which had already 
expired and so had nothing to gain from an injunction.336 Between 1860 and 
1865, filings at common law collapsed, with only scattered suits appearing 
thereafter.  
 
333.  Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10. 
334. Author’s Database, C.C.E.D. Pa., supra note 10. Cooper’s eight suits at law were all filed in 
March 1840, the equity suits in March and April. I do not have the exact dates of filing, but 
this plausibly suggests that filings in equity, designed to access preliminary injunctive relief, 
quickly followed filings at law. 
335. Id.  
336. Id. 
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Philadelphia’s 1860s farewell to common law patent suits is consistent with 
contemporary commentary. Prominent patent lawyers testifying before 
Congress in the late 1870s agreed that jury trials in infringement cases had 
largely disappeared, with one attorney ruminating that he had “tried an 
important case at law, I think, in 1865, and I believe that is the last one.”337 
These leading lights of the bar explained the development in terms of “the 
mental superiority of the court over a jury,” and couched their continuing 
preference for equity in terms of judicial expertise.338 
Patent law’s shift to equity is probably best described as both a cause and a 
consequence of the nineteenth-century litigation boom. The pressure of large-
scale enforcement and the volume of patent business in the courts pushed 
judges to overcome the traditional impediments and concentrate patent 
decision making in equity. In turn, the patentees who engaged in multiple 
litigation were the greatest beneficiaries of all-equity litigation. The shift to 
equity enabled them to undertake enforcement campaigns that they might not 
have been able to sustain—or to get past hostile juries—under common-law 
procedures. Soon after the shift of the 1850s and 1860s, the equity orientation 
of patent law was locked in by the 1870 Patent Act. Contra modern 
conventional wisdom, this was the ratification, rather than the beginning, of 
the all-equity phase. The Act gave the first statutory authorization for equity 
courts to rule on all defenses and issues available in patent litigation at law,339 
but this was “rather a recognition of what had already been established than its 
introduction.”340 The provision to allow damages in equity did break new 
ground, but it did so as a way of restoring the traditional range of remedies to a 
patent litigation system that had left common law behind. Once equity was 
established as the near-universal forum for patent suits, the law simply 
reshaped around that assumption.  
C. The Politics of the Patent System Under Pressure 
Finally, the history of the patent litigation explosion reveals a rich politics 
of the patent system. Today we tend to assume that patent law is not 
particularly “political,” in the sense of popular protest or factional mobilization. 
The whole area has a relatively technocratic air. In the nineteenth century, 
though, patent conflicts were not mere intramural disputes among inventors 
 
337. S. MISC. DOC. NO. 45-50, at 140 (1878).  
338. Id. at 141. 
339. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208. 
340. Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 205 (1881). 
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and manufacturers; they were often highly public matters, bound up in the 
heated politics of monopoly, and regular fodder for political agitation and 
congressional intervention.  
The middle nineteenth century has historically been portrayed as a 
judicially driven period in patent law, during which Congress remained on the 
sidelines.341 While it is true that there was little general patent legislation of 
great consequence between 1836 and 1861, this view misses the extent of 
Congress’s involvement. Congressional interventions, above all in the form of 
private bills extending patents, were highly influential and highly controversial 
in the politics of patents. Vast sums were reputedly poured into extension 
battles by the owners of the Woodworth,342 McCormick,343 and various rubber 
patents.344 In 1854, a congressional committee, appointed to investigate charges 
of bribery surrounding the attempted extension of Samuel Colt’s revolver 
patent, painted a lurid picture of the “[a]gents, attorneys, and letter-writers” 
employed to bombard legislators in patent extension cases.345 “[C]ostly and 
extravagant entertainments” were laid on for “ladies and Members of Congress 
and others” in support of extension bills.346 The “most efficient agents” 
available for hire were the credentialed correspondents of the daily press, 
whose access to the House floor was supposedly contingent on a pledge not to 
lobby, but who in practice were employed in large numbers by the backers of 
“railroad, patent, and other schemes.”347  
On the other side, opposition to patent extensions produced genuine 
popular mobilizations. In Philadelphia, a “mass meeting” of lumbermen and 
carpenters was held in 1850 to arrange resistance to the proposed Woodworth 
 
341. See, e.g., Morriss & Nard, supra note 258, at 160 (“The federal courts again became the 
forum of choice from the 1836 Patent Act until after the Civil War, with only lesser statutory 
changes occurring in the interim.”). 
342. See, e.g., The Woodworth Patent Extension, SCI. AM., Feb. 14, 1852, at 170 (“Money can do 
anything with some men, and the Woodworth patent power has the most potent 
influence.”).  
343. See, e.g., The “Patent” Lobby in the Field—the Different Interests at Work, &c, SCI. AM., Jan. 30, 
1858, at 166 (“McCormick, the reaper patentee, is also here . . . . He has plenty of money to 
prosecute his matter, but so far he has had but meager success.”). 
344. See, e.g., James Parton, Log-Rolling at Washington, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1869, at 369 
(“The head of the Chaffee-patent lobby was that most indomitable of all the india-rubber 
men,—Horace H. Day, owner of the Chaffee patent, a man capable of spending seventy 
thousand dollars upon an election. Both of these lobbies spent money, both before and after 
the junction, as freely as it is ever spent for such purposes.”). 
345. H.R. REP. NO. 33-353, at 3 (1854). 
346. Id. at 4. 
347. Id. at 6. 
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planing machine patent extension. The Pennsylvania legislature was 
subsequently one of a number that passed resolutions against congressional 
approval (which was ultimately denied).348 “Remonstrance after remonstrance” 
was sent to Congress against a further extension of the Parker water wheel 
patent in 1854.349 They came “from Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and New 
York, and Maine, and Indiana, and indeed from almost every state in which 
mills are used,” and each was “signed by hundreds of individuals.”350 The 
successful campaign against extension of McCormick’s reaper patent saw 
petitions pour into Congress from counties, towns, and state legislatures in 
New York, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and 
Vermont.351 Similar agitation greeted the extension lobbying of Goodyear and 
Howe. Given the bitterness of these battles, it is unsurprising that the principal 
forum for patent extensions shifted from Congress to the much more friendly 
confines of the Patent Office.352 Here too, though, anger with selectively 
protracted patent rights eventually led to the abolition of administrative 
extensions in the 1861 Patent Act. At that time the Commissioner’s power to 
extend grants by seven years was ended, and the standard patent term was 
lengthened to seventeen years instead.353  
After the Civil War, the most active politics of patents took place in 
Western states. The Midwest and West were the heartland of antimonopoly 
politics during that period, much of it associated with the so-called granger 
movement—an agrarian social and political movement that fought to secure 
state regulation of railroads and other monopoly services in the early 1870s.354 
Yet hostility to patents did not start out as an inherent feature of generalized 
antimonopoly or anticorporate sentiment. Instead, it emerged as a reaction to 
the leading campaigns of large-scale patent assertion. As reported by the 
agricultural historian Earl Hayter, farmers began to encounter the patent 
system with increasing frequency in the 1870s.355 With new farm machinery 
 
348. Cooper, supra note 38, at 313. 
349. H.R. REP. NO. 33-297, at 2 (1854). 
350. Id. 
351. SALEM G. PATTISON, THE MCCORMICK EXTENSION CASE OF 1848, at 83-162, 269-310 (1900). 
352. See supra Section II.B.1. 
353. Patent Act of 1861, ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 246, 249. 
354. See SOLON JUSTUS BUCK, THE GRANGER MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL 
ORGANIZATION AND ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL MANIFESTATIONS, 1870-1880 
(1913); GEORGE H. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS (1971). 
355. See Earl W. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, 1875-1888, 34 MISS. VALLEY 
HIST. REV. 59, 61 (1947) [hereinafter Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent]; 
Hayter, supra note 111; see also Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls 
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proliferating and the patent system growing rapidly, the countryside began to 
fill with “patent sharks”—agents of the various patent interests who demanded 
license fees directly from users.356 Many farmers were themselves drawn into 
schemes that involved purchasing local patent rights for assertion.357 By the late 
1870s, Minnesota’s U.S. Senator William Windom declared that  
there is not a farmer in this country to-day who is not liable to a score 
of suits or more for the infringement of patents on his farming 
implements . . . . There are a dozen things in your kitchen, your library, 
your dining room, your workshop . . . [on] which you must pay or be 
subjected to harassing suits.358 
The largest of these campaigns provoked grassroots mobilization and 
political response. Various fronts sprang up against the driven-well patent. In 
Michigan, for example, the State Grange coordinated resistance to the driven-
well patent, soliciting a dollar from every willing well user for collective 
defense.359 Farmers’ associations in Iowa and Minnesota raised thousands of 
dollars to fight Green’s patent as far as the U.S. Supreme Court.360 Ohio had 
county-level antidrivewell associations with hundreds of dues-paying 
members.361 State political representatives were soon drawn in: Minnesota’s 
legislature appropriated $7,500 for its citizens’ defensive efforts.362 Similarly, 
resistance to the barbed-wire patents took a political turn. Iowa farmers held a 
state convention in 1881 and formed the Farmers’ Protective Association to 
fight the Washburn & Moen syndicate and its Glidden patent.363 The 
Association established a “free factory” in Des Moines to supply wire at well 
below the patent holder’s prices, and the state legislature provided $5,000 for 
legal defense.364 Agrarian activism played out in other cases as well. A much-
 
and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1819-25 (2007) (discussing patent 
trolls in the late nineteenth century). 
356. Magliocca, supra note 355, at 1819-25. 
357. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, supra note 355, at 63. 
358. Id.  
359. Hayter, supra note 111, at 22. 
360. BENJAMIN F. GUE, 3 HISTORY OF IOWA: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE BEGINNING OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 141 (1903); Hayter, supra note 111, at 22. 
361. Hayter, supra note 111, at 26 n.59. 
362. GUE, supra note 360, at 142. 
363. Id. at 104; see also Hayter, An Iowa Farmers’ Protective Association, supra note 124, at 336 
(describing the proliferation of “protective societ[ies]” organized to fund litigation efforts). 
364. GUE, supra note 360, at 106; see also Merchs.’ Union Barb-Wire Co. v. Brown, 20 N.W. 434 
(Iowa 1884) (upholding the state’s appropriation against constitutional challenge). 
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loathed patent for a simple form of farm gate aroused opposition from granges 
in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Illinois, before being invalidated by the courts in 
1879.365 Granger organizations also fought attempts by the sewing machine 
patent pool to extend some of its more important grants. In response to a 
congressional extension of one sewing-machine patent in 1872, the rural press 
demanded the defeat of representatives who had voted for the measure.366  
During the 1870s and 1880s, these collective defense efforts coalesced into a 
broader movement for reform of the patent laws. The National Grange and the 
state granges of Iowa and Wisconsin formed committees to consider patent 
reform as early as 1874.367 Calls for revision began with the elimination of 
extensions and “indiscriminate . . . re-issuing of patents” before moving on to 
encompass more fundamental changes in patent enforceability.368 Demands for 
outright abolition of the patent system flared here and there, but made little or 
no headway within the (generally technologically enthusiastic) major farmers’ 
organizations.369 Farmers’ representatives were quick to deny that they 
disfavored inventors: as one granger leader stated, “[N]o one has been found 
simple minded enough not to give credit to inventive genius, for much of our 
improved system of agriculture. It is not ‘inventors’ nor just laws protecting 
them that we oppose.”370 Instead, the 1870s and early 1880s saw a flood of 
petitions and memorials to Congress from state legislatures, granges, and ad 
hoc citizens’ groups calling for changes in the law or protesting particular 
patents or patent extensions.371 By one account, the frequency of such 
 
365. Wright v. McMillan, 30 F. Cas. 679 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1877) (No. 18,083); R.C. Carpenter, 
Our Patent System, in EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE STATE BOARD 
OF AGRICULTURE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 209, 217-20 (1880); Hayter, The Patent System 
and Agrarian Discontent, supra note 355, at 74. 
366. HAL S. BARRON, MIXED HARVEST: THE SECOND GREAT TRANSFORMATION IN THE RURAL 
NORTH, 1870-1930, at 172 (1997); see also BUCK, supra note 354, at 119 (noting that “the claim 
is made that the influence of the Grange prevented the extension of patents on sewing-
machines”). 
367. BUCK, supra note 354, at 119. 
368. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, supra note 355, at 77; see also Fifth Day, 
Evening Session, 8 J. PROC. ANN. SESSION NAT’L GRANGE PATRONS HUSBANDRY 62 (1874) 
(urging reform to a system that rewarded “plain and simple inventions by the prolonged 
continuance of letters patent”). 
369. See, e.g., Seventh Day, Morning Session, 9 J. PROC. ANN. SESSION NAT’L GRANGE PATRONS 
HUSBANDRY 67, 72 (1875) (failing to adopt an abolition resolution and expressing “doubt as 
to the policy of Congress abolishing the system of patents entirely”). 
370. First Day, 16 J. PROC. ANN. SESSION NAT’L GRANGE PATRONS HUSBANDRY 12 (1882). 
371. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, supra note 355, at 78. 
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remonstrances in the pages of the Congressional Record was second only to that 
of petitions concerning Civil War pensions.372  
Grappling with the problems of patent litigation was central to the reform 
agenda. Above all, the farmers and their political representatives protested the 
practices of end-user litigation, many of which they alleged amounted to 
“legalized blackmailing and robbery.”373 The sheer distance of most Western 
farmers from a U.S. circuit court forced accused infringers “to submit to . . . 
blackmailing extortions, or travel several hundred miles to put in an answer” to 
a ten-dollar complaint.374 The impracticality of defending such suits only made 
it easier for “patent-rights sharpers”375 to assert “trivial,”376 “spurious,”377 or 
“worthless”378 grants. Acting on behalf of home-state legislatures and granges, 
Western and Midwestern senators proposed a variety of statutory changes 
designed to eliminate litigation of this type. The favorite of the grangers was an 
“innocent purchaser” provision that would exempt from liability any defendant 
who had purchased the infringing article “for his own private use” without 
knowledge of the patent.379 Another proposal, similarly radical in placing end 
users beyond the reach of patent law, was to hold only manufacturers and 
vendors of patented articles liable for infringement, while exempting both 
users and parties who manufactured for their own personal use without 
knowledge of the patent.380 One amendment aimed to make farmer suits 
uneconomical by requiring even victorious patentees to pay defendants’ costs 
in cases where less than fifty dollars was recovered.381 
 
372. Id. 
373. 8 CONG. REC. 303 (1878) (statement of Sen. Windom). 
374. Id. 
375. 8 CONG. REC. 1371 (1879) (statement of Rep. Deering). 
376. 8 CONG. REC. 303 (1878) (statement of Sen. Windom). 
377. Carpenter, supra note 365, at 212. 
378. Id. 
379. 8 CONG. REC. 296 (1878) (discussing the amendment offered by Senator Windom); see also 
USSELMAN, supra note 127, at 148-50 (relaying the background and rationale for “innocent 
purchaser provisions,” but noting that such bills carried baggage that transcended the 
immediate issue of patents). 
380. 10 CONG. REC. 102 (1880) (discussing the amendment offered by Senator Butler).  
381. 8 CONG. REC. 303 (1878) (discussing the amendment offered by Senator Windom). The 
granger proposals presented cost shifting principally as a means to place the costs of farmer 
suits on plaintiffs, but a more modern conception of cost shifting as a remedy for unfounded 
litigation positions was also aired during the 1870s. See, e.g., S. MISC. DOC. NO. 45-50, at 138 
(1878) (“If we could find any way by which the court should be authorized to make a 
handsome allowance for expenses and counsel-fees against the party, either a vexatious 
plaintiff or a vexatious defendant, who had made a frivolous and vexatious claim or a 
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These measures aimed at curtailing particular classes of litigation were 
joined by proposals to rein in certain kinds of heavily litigated patents. 
Reformers sought a system of periodical maintenance fees that would do away 
with the problem of “old and worthless” patents being dredged up for reissue 
and enforcement.382 Meanwhile, complaints about the number of trivial grants 
were answered by a call to enforce more meaningful standards of utility.383 The 
statute already required that a patent issue only for inventions deemed 
“sufficiently useful and important,”384 but many by the 1870s saw the 
restriction as a dead letter. “The whole country, every branch of business, every 
conceivable thing,” lamented Michigan Senator Isaac Christiancy, “is infested 
with these nuisances, as numerous and annoying as the frogs or the lice of 
Egypt.”385 The same lawmaker spoke ardently of his desire to limit patent-
eligible subject matter, cutting off problematic branches of the patent system 
by eliminating protection for clothing, toys, and “any patents for medicines or 
medical compositions.”386  
At its peak, the agrarian patent reform movement stood a real chance of 
imposing dramatic statutory reform on the patent system. What made the 
farmers particularly dangerous to the established patent law was the emergence 
of an improbable ally: the railroads. As heavy consumers of invention (and 
possessors of the deepest pockets in the industrial economy), the major 
railroad companies had spent the 1870s battling a series of suits by the 
patentees of indispensable railroading technologies.387 Railroad lobbyists in 
Congress chiefly targeted the doctrines of recovery in equity that had begun to 
subject them to enormous monetary awards for infringement,388 but they also 
made common cause with the grangers on matters such as reissue abuse, 
statutes of limitations, the introduction of patent maintenance fees, and the 
 
frivolous and vexatious defense, it seems to me that would be a step in the right direction. 
We have considered that matter somewhat.”). 
382. 8 CONG. REC. 271 (1878) (statement of Sen. Hoar). The United States would eventually 
adopt maintenance fees in 1980. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2012)). 
383. 8 CONG. REC. 306-07 (1878) (statement of Sen. Christiancy). 
384. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 31, 16 Stat. 198, 202. 
385. Id. at 307. Similarly, the Senator opined, “It is to be regretted that the Commissioners and 
examiners have not more liberally exercised this power [to deny insufficiently useful 
patents] . . . . No patent should be issued, unless the invention contains some new and 
important principle.” Id. 
386. Id. at 308. 
387. Usselman & John, supra note 129, at 103-09. 
388. USSELMAN, supra note 127, at 110-13, 145-46. 
 the yale law journal 	 125 :848   20 16  
930 
 
need to reduce the profusion of “insignificant” patents.389 Nor were the 
railroads the only elite supporters of patent reform. The critiques mounted by 
the farmers and the railroads attracted a number of New England 
congressmen, most from the faction styled as “liberal reformers” or (more 
mockingly) as “Mugwumps.”390 This group approached patent reform as a 
good-government problem, and was advised on the shortcomings of the 
system by the cream of the Boston patent bar.391 
Despite the combination of powerful constituencies for some kind of patent 
reform, major statutory changes did not occur. Several bills passed the House 
of Representatives between 1877 and 1884, some of them by wide margins.392 
These included radical, granger-inflected measures: in 1882, for example, the 
House voted 155-49 for a bill providing that no user, innocent or otherwise, 
would be liable for infringement “when it shall appear on the trial that the 
defendant . . . purchased said article for a valuable consideration in the open 
market.”393 These products of the more populist, farmer-influenced House 
were unable to pass the more conservative Senate.394 A number of industrial-
state senators, some of whom had been lawyers in patent cases themselves, 
allied with vocal advocates of inventors’ rights to block the moderate and 
radical reform bills alike.395 The result was legislative stasis during the 1880s. 
Patent reform remained a live issue in agrarian politics: various populist third 
parties such as the Greenback Party and American Prohibition Party included 
patent planks in their electoral platforms.396 Meanwhile an uneasy stalemate 
reigned in Congress. The two major parties were said to forbear from taking 
affirmative positions on patent matters “for fear of losing farmers’ votes.”397 As 
late as 1888 the National Electric Light Association withdrew its plan to 
petition Congress for a commission of inquiry into patent reform, having been 
 
389. See, e.g., S. MISC. DOC. NO. 45-50, at 108-11, 123 (1878). J.H. Raymond was the lead lawyer 
for the Western Railroad Association, the industry’s main collective patent defense 
organization. Id. at 225-26. 
390. USSELMAN, supra note 127, at 150; Usselman & John, supra note 129, at 111-14. 
391. See, e.g., S. MISC. DOC. NO. 45-50, at 13 (including the statements of Chauncey Smith and 
J.J. Storrow, testifying in support of the proposed bills). 
392. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, supra note 355, at 80-81. 
393. H.R. 6018, 47th Cong. (1882); 13 CONG. REC. 3952, 3955 (1882). 
394. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, supra note 355, at 81. 
395. Usselman & John, supra note 129, at 114-16. 
396. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, supra note 355, at 78. 
397. Id. at 81 n.84 (first quoting 22 W. RURAL & AM. STOCKMAN 668 (1884); then quoting 12 W. 
MANUFACTURER 194 (1884); and then quoting 13 W. MANUFACTURER 35 (1885)). 
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warned by patent lawyers that doing so might invite an attempt to sweep away 
the entire system.398 
Stymied in Congress, the political pressure on the patent system leaked out 
in other ways. One was in the states, where legislatures focused on curtailing 
the frauds that accompanied rampant peddling of patent rights. Farmers were 
targets not only for infringement suits but also for schemes that involved the 
sale of territorial patent assignments. As dispensed by “patent swindlers” and 
“note-shavers,” these sometimes involved dubious rights, hidden obligations 
to purchase machinery or take on debt, or outright forgery.399 In response, 
states passed, and courts regularly upheld, statutes that regulated the format of 
promissory notes given for patent rights—and even, in the case of Indiana, 
required any seller of a patent right to file copies of the patent with the local 
county clerk and to swear out an affidavit confirming his authority to sell.400  
Another, more irregular outlet for patent politics ran through the federal 
executive. The catalyst for these efforts was an 1871 Supreme Court decision, 
Mowry v. Whitney, which decreed that a judicial proceeding for the cancellation 
of a fraudulent patent could only be instituted by the U.S. government or its 
officers.401 The 1870s and 1880s then saw repeated attempts to draw the 
executive branch into ad hoc actions against the most unpopular mass-enforced 
patents. Opponents of the barbed wire and Roberts oil torpedo patents, among 
others, gained the Attorney General’s permission to bring fraud suits against 
their respective patentees in the name of the United States.402 Those suits 
gained little traction, but the practice broke through into all-too-public view in 
1885, when a rival of the Bell Telephone monopoly secured a government suit 
to cancel Bell’s controlling patent for fraud and other misconduct.403 The fact 
that the U.S. Attorney General was a major shareholder in the anti-Bell 
company in question triggered a scandal, plunging both President Cleveland’s 
 
398. See C.A. Brown, Revision of the Patent Law, W. ELECTRICIAN, Jan. 21 1888, at 31 (describing 
the National Electric Light Association’s proposal to Congress); Reform of the Patent System, 
ELECTRICAL WORLD, Apr. 14, 1888, at 186 (reporting the National Electric Light 
Association’s decision to abandon its plan in the face of the “great opposition that was 
expressed to it among many of [its] legal brethren”). 
399. See Hayter, supra note 355, at 68-73. 
400. See Brechbill v. Randall, 1 N.E. 362, 363 (Ind. 1885) (upholding the Indiana statute); 
ROBINSON, supra note 290, § 1242, at 680-81 (collecting state-court decisions). 
401. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434, 439 (1871). 
402. See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 133, at 92-93. 
403. See id. at 88-91. 
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Administration and the already-notorious Bell patent into a further humiliating 
round of newspaper headlines and congressional inquiries.404 
 The extent to which this political climate affected judicial treatment of 
patents is an intriguing and, at this point, still open question. It is certainly 
possible to trace some lines of response to the crisis of patent law and litigation 
in the decades after the Civil War. The clearest example is the reaction against 
opportunistic reissues, which the Supreme Court—especially in the person of 
Justice Bradley—led in the later 1870s and early 1880s.405 Elsewhere, in Atlantic 
Works v. Brady, Justice Bradley sought to reinvigorate the invention (now 
“nonobviousness”) requirement while offering a famous statement of disgust 
for speculative patent assertion: 
It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every 
trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea . . . . Such an 
indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct 
than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers 
who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of 
improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, 
which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, 
without contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts.406  
Among those engaged in patent litigation, judicial sensitivity to patent 
politics was a constant concern. The barbed-wire patentees chose courts and 
judges carefully, while privately expressing fear that “[t]he political agitation of 
demagogues in inciting the farmer, is beginning to tell upon the Court.”407 The 
Bell telephone interests lived in fear of a judge with “any taint of grangerism or 
any political bee in his bonnet.”408 Henry Wallace, a leading agricultural 
journalist and organizer of the Farmers’ Protective Association against the 
barbed-wire patent, opined in 1888: 
 
404. See id. at 89-90. 
405. See supra notes 213-217 and accompanying text. 
406. 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883); see also Usselman & John, supra note 129, at 117-19 (placing Justice 
Bradley’s opinion in the context of ongoing patent reform campaigns as well as Justice 
Bradley’s history of creative engagement with questions of monopoly). 
407. Hayter, supra note 355, at 80 (quoting Letter from Benjamin F. Thurston to Isaac L. Ellwood 
(Apr. 29, 1881) (on file with Ellwood Estate, DeKalb, Illinois)). 
408. ARTHUR S. PIER, FORBES: TELEPHONE PIONEER 149 (1953) (quoting Letter from William 
Forbes, President, Bell Co., to James Storrow, Lead Patent Counsel, Bell Co. (Sept. 13, 
1884)). 
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Slowly and yet surely the highest courts are voicing what is known as 
“granger” sentiment. Twenty years ago almost any patent would be 
sustained and any kind of robbery could be practiced under the plea of 
a “Patent;” now the courts discriminate and the people get their rights 
if they will but fight for them.409 
Scientific American, a close watcher of all things patent law, detected in 1885 a 
“recent tendency of the courts to destroy patents,”410 and in 1887 depicted a 
Supreme Court “much more vigorous in its treatment of patents than were the 
old school of judges.”411 In that same year, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
driven-well patent it had previously upheld.412  
Both the “granger sentiment” and the litigation explosion that had 
provoked it faded from patent law in the last decade of the nineteenth century. 
Whether caused by judicial disfavor or something else, the decline of mass-
farmer suits after the 1880s took much of the sting out of populist antagonism 
toward the patent system. Attempts to impose major reform of the law ceased. 
Meanwhile the end of extensions and the crackdown on reissues mitigated 
some of the most pungent criticisms of patent practice and likely contributed to 
lowering the litigation pressure as well. Gradually the growing organization of 
the American economy changed the context in which most suits were 
contested. Patent litigation by the 1900s was much more of a tournament 
between companies than the individual free-for-all that it had been during the 
Gilded Age.413 That did not mean that patent politics ceased, just that it 
refocused toward questions of corporate behavior and antitrust.414 
 
 
409. RICHARD KIRKENDALL, UNCLE HENRY: A DOCUMENTARY PROFILE OF THE FIRST HENRY 
WALLACE 55 (2d ed. 2002) (quoting an editorial by Henry Wallace).  
410. The Reis Telephones, SCI. AM., Aug. 22, 1885, at 113. 
411. The Bell Telephone Suits, SCI. AM., Feb. 5, 1887, at 80. 
412. See Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U.S. 267 (1887) (invalidating the driven-well patent); Beedle v. 
Bennett, 122 U.S. 71 (1887) (finding the driven-well patent valid); Eames v. Andrews, 122 
U.S. 40 (1887) (finding the driven-well patent valid). 
413. See supra Section II.B.3. 
414. See generally FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY (1956) (tracing the abusive uses of 
patents throughout American history up to 1941). 
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conclusion 
Although long past, the patent crisis of the nineteenth century still seems to 
hang in the air. It is striking how many themes of the 1870s and 1880s find 
echoes in responses to the modern patent litigation explosion. As detailed 
above, those years featured fierce reactions against aggressive patent 
enforcement, a familiar picture today.415 Then, as now, the backlash against 
patent abuse summoned forth a broad range of legal and regulatory initiatives, 
including some from actors not usually involved in patent matters. Thus new 
state-level actions adopting a “consumer protection” stance against patent 
abuses416 and atypical ventures by the executive branch in combatting 
notorious patent enforcers417 took their place alongside incremental but 
noticeable judicial moves to curb excessive patent assertion.418 On the level of 
patent doctrine and procedure, the late nineteenth century also saw moves to 
limit end-user patent suits,419 proposals for cost shifting in litigation,420 
 
415. For the modern reaction to “patent trolls,” see sources cited supra note 7. 
416. Compare supra text accompanying notes 399-400 (describing state antifraud statutes), with 
Consumer Protection Complaint, State v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 2013 VT Super. Ct. 282U 
(enforcing a state consumer protection statute).  
417. Compare supra text accompanying notes 401-404 (describing attempts to encourage the 
executive branch to take action against mass-enforced campaigns), with Press Release, 
Federal Trade Commission, FTC Settlement Bars Patent Assertion Entity from Using 
Deceptive Tactics (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/11/ftc-settlement-bars 
-patent-assertion-entity-using-deceptive [http://perma.cc/C8LU-8ZPA] (“[T]he FTC has 
taken action using its consumer protection authority against a patent assertion entity.”).  
418. Compare supra text accompanying notes 405-412 (describing doctrinal changes), with Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (subject-matter eligibility), and Octane 
Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (attorney’s fees), and 
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (same), and eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(injunctions). 
419. Compare supra text accompanying note 380 (describing a proposal to limit patent litigation 
to vendors and manufacturers), with Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 5 (2015) 
(providing for partial stays in patent litigation between patentees and consumers), and Brian 
J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law’s Customer Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 
1605 (2013) (proposing expansion of the consumer-suit exception). 
420. Compare supra text accompanying note 381 (describing a proposal for fee shifting in cases 
where the defendant’s costs exceeded fifty dollars), with H.R. 9 § 3(b)(1) (proposing 
mandatory fee shifting “unless the court finds that the position and conduct of the 
nonprevailing party or parties were reasonably justified in law and fact or that special 
circumstances . . . make an award unjust”).  
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concern about the number of minor or low-quality patents,421 suggestions that 
maintenance fees might be used to reduce the assertion of older patents,422 and 
at least a little discussion of restricting patent-eligible subject matter to reduce 
purportedly low-quality grants.423 Many of these proposals emerged from 
strange-bedfellow reformist coalitions of large high-tech firms and grassroots 
antipatent cultures; instead of the sometimes-awkward alliance between 
Silicon Valley giants and hacker activists, the nineteenth century offered 
railroad companies and farmers.424 Finally, private ordering efforts arose 
within sectors of industry particularly affected by large-scale litigation. Patent 
pooling and other defensive arrangements, increasingly popular in recent years 
as a buffer against patent assertion, had their forerunners in organizations such 
as the Sewing Machine Combination and the railroad associations.425 
Everything old is new again. 
 
421. Compare supra text accompanying notes 383-385 (describing support for a stronger utility 
standard), with R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2135, 2136 (2009) (noting that “the need to improve patent quality is essentially 
undisputed”). 
422. Compare supra text accompanying note 382 (describing a proposed system for maintenance 
fees that would discourage late-term litigation of old patents), with Brian J. Love, An 
Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls 
Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (2013) (arguing that the current 
system of maintenance fees does not do enough to discourage high volumes of late-term 
patent litigation by trolls). 
423. Compare supra text accompanying note 386 (describing a proposal to exclude some 
inventions from patent eligibility), with Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 
Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-28 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Patent law seeks to avoid the 
dangers of overprotection just as surely as it seeks to avoid the diminished incentive to 
invent that underprotection can threaten. One way in which patent law seeks to sail between 
these opposing and risky shoals is through rules that bring certain types of invention and 
discovery within the scope of patentability while excluding others.”). 
424. Compare supra text accompanying notes 387-391 (describing the alliance between agrarian 
patent reformers and railroads), with Florian Mueller, U.S. Patent Reform Movement  
Lacks Strategic Leadership, Fails To Leverage the Internet, FOSS PATENTS (May 20, 2014,  
10:27 AM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/05/us-patent-reform-movement-lacks.html 
[http://perma.cc/EE2A-WK74] (describing the alliance between anti-software-patent 
activists and “companies like Google, Facebook, and Twitter”), and Consumer Elecs. Ass’n, 
One Year Since the Innovation Act, and Still No Patent Reform, TECHDIRT (Dec. 1, 2014, 12:04 
PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141126/12052129261/one-year-since-innovation 
-act-still-no-patent-reform.shtml [http://perma.cc/JGQ7-KGWF] (promoting “grassroots 
advocacy tools” on behalf of a trade association lobbying effort). 
425. Compare supra text accompanying note 84 (describing the Sewing Machine Combination), 
and supra text accompanying note 131 (describing the railroad patent defense organizations), 
with Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 386-88 (2012) 
(describing market-based and collective self-help approaches to patent defense), and Google 
Patent Programs, GOOGLE http://www.google.com/patents/licensing [http://perma.cc 
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To take the old on its own terms for a moment: this Article has suggested a 
number of inputs to the rise and fall of the first patent litigation explosion. The 
defining feature of this wave of suits was the advent of large-scale patent 
enforcement, which began in the 1840s and continued, in the form of massive 
regional and national litigation campaigns, in the decades after the Civil 
War.426 Spanning a broad range of technologies, such efforts reveal several 
factors driving patent litigation to a historic peak. One was the state of patent 
law and administration, which proved especially susceptible to maximizing 
rights. Patent owners made full use of—indeed, stretched the limits of—tools 
such as term extensions and reissues, along with central claiming and mostly 
liberal treatment by the courts and the Patent Office.427 Patentee 
resourcefulness of this type combined with envelope pushing of another kind, 
in the form of multiple suits and enforcement against large numbers of 
defendants.428 Strategies of mass enforcement were supported by structures of 
litigation management (territorial assignments, networks of agents, and 
lawyers working on contingency) that made them possible.429 Crucially, 
plaintiffs from midcentury onwards were able to take full advantage of equity, 
a jurisdictional option that was both procedurally more efficient for large-scale 
patent litigation and more politically insulated by the lack of juries.430 And 
contributing to the numerical proliferation of suits were two other factors 
related to the profile of defendants: first, the disaggregated nature of most 
economic activity, which made a multiplicity of suits somewhat inevitable,431 
and second, the tendency of defendants in the most notorious mass-
enforcement actions to defy the patent en masse and to organize collective 
resistance.432  
As to the causes of the decline in patent litigation at the end of the 
nineteenth century, the evidence presented here is more indirect. A study of the 
parties and patents that did go to court can never give a completely satisfying 
 
/HT8Y-BHVS] (describing Google’s cross-licensing and license-on-transfer programs), and 
Adi Kamdar, Troll-Proofed Defensive Patent License Launches with 23 Patents from EFF 
Cofounder, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 9, 2014) http://www.eff.org/deeplinks 
/2014/12/troll-proofed-defensive-patent-license-launches-23-patents-eff-cofounder [http:// 
perma.cc/P74Z-5YDG] (introducing the Defensive Patent License program). 
426. See supra Part I. 
427. See supra Section II.B.1.  
428. See supra Sections I.C, II.B.2. 
429. See supra Part I, Section II.B.2. 
430. See supra Section III.B. 
431. See supra Sections I.C, II.B.3.  
432. See supra Section I.C. 
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explanation of those that did not. However, it is possible to demonstrate the 
reversal of earlier conditions that had underpinned the litigation explosion. 
Patents became less promising instruments of rent seeking when Congress and 
the courts quashed extensions and reissues as tools of patent stretching.433 
Meanwhile the changing politics of patent law may have curdled judicial 
support into judicial hostility—a hard-to-quantify but potentially influential 
factor in patentees’ decisions about whether, whom, and how to sue.434 By the 
end of the century, economic changes diminished the supply-side pressures for 
litigation. The rise of large-scale business organization, the consolidation of the 
manufacturing economy, and the increasingly corporate basis of invention all 
favored fewer disputes: patent owners and potential infringers were less 
interested in pursuing litigation as a business strategy, better able to bargain 
around it, and less inclined or required to sue large numbers of end users.435 
As a history of the development of American patent law, this account is an 
advance over the prior art in several respects. By identifying the great patent 
enforcement battles of the period as a collective phenomenon, and by 
quantifying patent litigation through actual case filings rather than reported 
decisions, this Article uncovers the hitherto hidden scale of the first patent 
litigation explosion. From this vantage point, we can observe common 
dynamics that have remained buried in earlier views of the past, such as the 
role of equity as a cause and consequence of large-scale litigation, as well as 
cross-cutting issues of organizational context such as the prevalence of multiple 
litigation in patent enforcement. These variables make it easier to understand 
the development of American patent law from a practical and procedural 
perspective, rather than having to try and explain the principal changes in the 
field solely through the lens of (or worse, as a function of) the limited corpus of 
judicial opinions. In a predominantly judge-made system such as American 
patent law,436 a generational flood of cases in the courts is a highly formative 
phenomenon. It is no exaggeration to say that the nineteenth-century litigation 
wave helped to shape the foundations of modern patent jurisprudence, both by 
providing the cases and controversies for our foundational decisions and 
through the fateful jurisdictional shift that it propelled from common law into 
equity. The role of economic change as a background matter also becomes 
somewhat clearer: with the data available from case filings, we can see how 
 
433. See supra Section II.B.1. 
434. See supra Sections II.B.2, III.C.  
435. See supra Section II.B.3.  
436. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(2007); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51 
(2010). 
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patent litigation reflected the dramatic transformations taking place in 
innovation and economic organization in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  
Part of the value of identifying a “first” patent litigation explosion, of 
course, is in asking how it might inform our understanding of modern 
conditions. Two questions follow: first, whether the nineteenth-century peak 
tells us anything about the drivers of patent litigation in our own time; and 
second, whether it can illuminate current debates over patent reform. As to the 
first of these, I would urge a healthy caution. Some variables and institutional 
settings are meaningfully comparable; others are not. In the latter category 
would go most factors relating to economic scale and organization: the 
capabilities of firms in the present day are worlds apart from those of 
nineteenth-century plaintiffs and defendants, when the very act of traveling to 
a distant federal court might pose substantial costs. More pointedly, there are 
both economic and procedural reasons why “patent suits” might not be truly 
comparable between eras. We cannot assume that the purposes or costs of 
suing were similar, and it is demonstrably true that what counts as a suit is a 
measure that changes over time. Modern joinder rules—which developments 
since the America Invents Act have made clear are a major determinant of 
current suit-filing numbers437—make the number of disputes per case 
potentially quite different between the nineteenth century and today. 
As a result, comparative observations about the drivers of patent litigation 
are possible only at a fairly high level of generality. One simple point that 
deserves nuanced inquiry is the relationship between the rapid growth of 
litigation and the growth rate of patenting. The first patent litigation explosion 
coincided with the highest growth rate of patent grants in U.S. history;438 the 
current expansion of litigation with the highest absolute year-on-year growth 
of applications and issuances.439 The sheer number of patents available for 
enforcement surely drives much of the increase in suits, but the relationship 
between the two is not constant, as the changing ratio of suits to patents in 
force shows.440 There is room to ask whether sudden periods of intense 
litigation are propelled by some of the same background forces that drive 
episodes of heightened patenting. Dramatic technological change would be one 
contender. The willingness of the Patent Office to issue (and reissue) broader 
 
437. See sources cited supra note 4. 
438. See Marco et al., supra note 24, at 31 fig.5. 
439. Id. at 30 fig.4. 
440. Katznelson, supra note 9, at 11; see also supra Table 1.  
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or lower-quality patents would be another.441 Others would be more cultural or 
institutional (or both): the existence of a “gold rush” mentality toward patents, 
for example,442 or the rise of new intermediaries in the patent space that are 
able and willing to create markets for patents and their enforcement.443 
Focusing on such features of the patent industry reveals perhaps the most 
resounding echo between past and present. During these periods of exploding 
patent litigation, the enforcement system itself became entrepreneurial. The 
prominence of committed patent-assertion ventures444—whether they are the 
Acacia Research Corporation or the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company—
and the rise of contingency-fee patent litigation445 reflect more than just the 
presence of opportunities for rent seeking; they also imply entrepreneurs, 
lawyers, and business models that are peculiarly attached to patent litigation 
and creative in pursuing it. This sector, in the nineteenth century and today, 
tends to generate the most aggressive enforcement strategies at the margin, 
including suits against small-scale users.446 Furthermore, the hard core of 
assertion-focused actors helps account for the skewed nature of overall 
litigation: the spiritual heirs of the twenty-nine plaintiffs who brought a third 
 
441. Compare supra Section II.B.1, with U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 28-
29 (citing stakeholders on the connection between patent quality and litigation). 
442. Compare, e.g., Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883) (deploring “a class of 
speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of 
improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies”), with KEVIN G. 
RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF 
PATENTS 13, 176 (2000) (referring to developments in the late 1990s as a “patent gold 
rush”), and Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent 
Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 199 (2000) (describing a “patent gold rush” in computing 
and biotechnology following the Federal Circuit’s relaxation of limits on patentable subject 
matter), and EXPstocktrader, Global Patent Wars Intensify in 2012, SEEKING ALPHA (June  
21, 2012, 4:21 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/673871-global-patent-wars-intensify-in 
-2012 [http://perma.cc/66Q2-V6SB] (declaring that “[t]his is really the year for the global 
‘Gold Rush’ in patent litigation”).  
443. Compare Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 31 (tracing the nineteenth-century appearance of 
patent agencies and attorneys as intermediaries in the market for patented inventions), with 
Chien, supra note 6 (describing the roles currently played by patent assertion entities and 
other intermediaries in the market for patented inventions). 
444. See, e.g., Cotropia et al., supra note 4; supra Part I (recounting the campaigns of the 
Woodworth syndicate, the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company, and the driven well patent 
interests). 
445. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 
ALA. L. REV. 335 (2012); supra text accompanying notes 231-234 (describing the franchise 
model of enforcement). 
446. See Bernstein, supra note 143, at 1455-58; supra Sections I.C, II.B.2. 
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of the litigation in the nineteenth-century sample described above447 are the 
thirty-five patentees who sued twenty-five percent of unique defendants in 
2012.448 It is worth reflecting on the impact of these factors on the politics of 
the patent system. The prominence of the “patent troll” motif in reform 
debates is not so much about the quantity of suits as it is about the 
displacement of previous norms and expectations regarding how, and against 
whom, patents are asserted.449 Aggressive litigation and end-user suits are 
problems relating to the cultures and business models of enforcement—
phenomena that this Article suggests have their own history. 
What about technological revolutions? Given modern transformations in 
sectors such as biotechnology and computing, it is not surprising that changes 
in technology or innovation practices are periodically invoked to explain rising 
patenting and litigation.450 Similarly, the sweep of the nineteenth century 
captures an enormous amount of economic and technological change. In the 
aggregate, this growth is too diffuse to be meaningful: one cannot point to any 
given decade or region and say this one featured an industrial revolution and 
this one did not. Instead, matching phases of technological change to patent 
litigation has to be the province of more focused industry studies, which can 
meaningfully trace the relationships between legal disputes and measurable 
technical change.451 From the less granular perspective of this Article, I would 
suggest only that the most-litigated patents offer a mixed picture. Some, like 
Thomas Blanchard’s, Samuel Morse’s, Charles Goodyear’s, Thomas Edison’s, 
or Alexander Graham Bell’s grants, offer a plausible case as struggles prompted 
by new breakthrough technologies—industrial revolutions brought into 
court.452 Yet other, even more heavily represented inventions, such as driven 
 
447. See supra Table 2. 
448. Cotropia et al., supra note 4, at 684. 
449. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 425, at 341 (pointing out that “PAEs and patent speculators don’t 
have to abide by industry norms, which have traditionally favored patent stalemate rather 
than war”).  
450. See, e.g., Katznelson, supra note 9, at 14; Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Stronger Protection 
or Technological Revolution: What Is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting? (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6204, 1997), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6204.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/YNA7-MFNM]. 
451. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 256 at 22-23 (patent litigation in the early automobile industry); 
Mossoff, supra note 80 (sewing machines); Shaver, supra note 132 (electric lamps); Lampe & 
Moser, supra note 84 (sewing machines).  
452. I make no claim that these men were the sole authors of their respective “Great Inventions.” 
To the extent that they are regarded as such, it probably has much to do with their 
successful patent litigation. See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 133, at 32; Mark A. Lemley, The Myth 
of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 710-11 (2012). Note that there is a circularity 
problem here: if the reputation of many Great Inventors was built on their patent 
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wells, oil torpedoes, and rubber dentures, were neither technically complex nor 
particularly revolutionary; they were just widely adopted and aggressively 
targeted for patent enforcement. Moreover, as suggested above, multiple 
litigation as a strategy was widespread and technologically agnostic, featuring 
inventions ranging from lamps to candy machines.453 Rapid technological 
change is an intuitive contributor to patent litigation explosions, but not a 
necessary one. 
Do the events of yesteryear provide lessons for current patent reform 
efforts today? The current appetite for stories about the past would seem to 
suggest that the answer to this question is yes. Recent years have seen growing 
attention to historical patent debates, especially those that accompanied the 
1870s and 1880s patent reform movement. Commentary has focused above all 
on the two case studies that have broken through from historical scholarship: 
Earl Hayter’s accounts of agrarian patent litigation and Steven Usselman’s 
history of patent struggles involving the railroads.454 Reasoning from these 
episodes, observers of modern patent reform have derived several principles. 
One is a bias toward incrementalism. Since agrarian patent wars and railroad 
conflicts were soothed without sweeping statutory measures, the argument 
goes, “reformers would be well-advised to focus on incremental court and 
market-based reforms.”455 Another conclusion is that sector-specific solutions 
prevailed. By one account, farmers’ patent woes arose when the courts made it 
easier to gain utility patents on minor design changes in farming tools, and 
ameliorated when the standards were raised again to prohibit such grants.456 
Elsewhere, the railroads’ troubles were purportedly addressed by self-help 
 
campaigning, then our historical canon of major technological breakthroughs will be 
defined in part by the inventions that produced the largest patent victories, and we will then 
tend to overidentify dramatic technological change with the patent system.  
453. See supra Table 3. 
454. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 13 
(2013); Chien, supra note 425, at 333-50; Magliocca, supra note 355; Robert P. Merges, The 
Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1583, 1592-95 (2009). 
455. Chien, supra note 425, at 390; see also Merges, supra note 454, at 1598 (arguing that history 
“shows that less drastic legal changes can be effective”). 
456. Magliocca, supra note 355, at 1820-32; see also Gerard N. Magliocca, Ornamental Design and 
Incremental Innovation, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 878-79 (2003) (tracing the reappearance of 
stricter patentability requirements in this area). Having not yet surveyed the court records of 
the Midwestern farm states, I cannot verify the role played by such patents in the litigation 
explosion. But the largest mass-enforcement campaigns, such as those for the driven well 
and barbed wire, did not fit that particular category of grant. 
 the yale law journal 	 125 :848   20 16  
942 
 
defensive arrangements457 and by the Supreme Court’s “‘surgical’ intervention” 
to reform the law of patent damages.458  
The existence of the first patent litigation explosion suggests that we 
should broaden the picture beyond these few case-studies. Sector-specific 
factors such as farm-tool patentability and railroad damages calculations would 
seem to have less explanatory power given that large-scale enforcement erupted 
and declined in a much wider range of industries. Incrementalism and court-
centered proposals, on the other hand, still make sense, albeit with an 
additional set of precedents: the judicial turn against reissues should be added 
to the list of remedial actions. At the big-picture level, this Article also suggests 
a need to direct greater attention to some of the broader background factors at 
work, many of which may be beyond the reach of patent reform: the relative 
fragmentation of the high-technology economy, the underlying structures of 
federal litigation, and the choice between judges and juries. 
Balancing out the reform-minded commentators is another set of 
historically informed scholars, for whom the commotions of the past provide 
reason to be sanguine about the present. In this view, “historical amnesia” has 
contributed to an unjustified sense that the travails of the current patent system 
are unprecedented and frightening.459 The long history of patent struggles and 
even their association with technological progress should counsel us against 
legislative or judicial overreaction.460 This is especially so given that the level of 
litigation does not seem unduly high by past standards.461 Moreover, the 
bugbears of present debate are not condemned by history: nonpracticing 
entities, for example, have a long lineage that includes admired inventors like 
Goodyear and Edison.462 And the record of older patent pools reminds us that 
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firms can adapt successfully to even the most ill-tempered patent 
environments.463 
This Article certainly agrees that exploding patent litigation is not new. For 
some observers, that may diminish the shock value of recent events. However, 
I would not stretch this insight into a claim about social costs. Gauging the 
economic and technological consequences of the golden age of patent litigation 
is a subject for future work; hopefully this outline of the legal phenomenon 
will be useful in conducting it. In the meantime, it remains unclear whether we 
should see the nineteenth-century experience as ominous, because it shows the 
inevitable rot of opportunism and rent seeking lurking within the patent 
system, or as reassuring, because it did not break the high-technology 
economy, which delivered a “golden era of . . . independent inventors”464 and 
the beginnings of the “second industrial revolution.”465  
Perhaps the last enduring mystery is how we could have forgotten such a 
dramatic origin tale for so long. At some point in the early twentieth century, 
patent litigation became boring—at least by comparison with its own earlier 
standards. The number of suits filed each year rarely cracked one thousand 
between the 1920s and the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.466 The 
politics of patent law, such as they were, centered not on spectacular trials or 
mass popular resistance but on the activities of large corporations; the leading 
public controversies took the form of complex antitrust battles and 
investigations into the corporate control of invention.467 Patent law as a 
practice area became rigorously specialized and was seen as a highly technical, 
often impenetrable discipline. Against this background, the world of the patent 
lawyer in the gray flannel suit became the predominant frame of reference both 
within the field and among lawyers more broadly. The spectacle of the 
nineteenth century was forgotten. In 1955, former New York Federal Judge 
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Simon Rifkind gave a generously spirited account of patent litigation entitled 
The Romance Discoverable in Patent Cases.468 Judge Rifkind admitted that patent 
law was “reputed to be dull, tedious, undramatic,” but promised that “if we 
who behold patent litigation will but look aright,” we should find “dramatic 
tales to tell.”469 Had he only known to look back a hundred years, he would 
have found all the drama one could need. 
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